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Introduction 
 
The EC Regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply (EC/994/2010) 
requires member states to make a full assessment of the risks affecting the security of gas 
supply. According to Article 9, this risk assessment must: 
 
(a) use the infrastructure and supply standards (articles 6 and 8);  
(b) take into account all relevant national and regional circumstances;  
(c) run various disruption scenarios;  
(d) identify the interaction and correlation of risks with other Member States. 
(e) take into account the maximal interconnection capacity of each border entry and 
exit point. 
 
The objective of this report is to provide guidance and advice for performing risk assessments. It 
will do so by first providing a literature review, and then by proposing a basic structure for 
undertaking a gas security risk assessment, in accordance with best practices and standard 
procedures found in risk management.  
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A review and categorisation of 
selected literature 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Scope and Objectives 
 
The first step in assessing the complex and disparate literature on (national or regional) risks to 
security of supply (and associated threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, and so on) is to identify the 
boundaries within which a given analysis falls. In doing so, it is also useful to recognise the 
different objectives of each study and the primary concepts employed.  
 
At the outset it is necessary to note that the literature reviewed are not all classical risk 
assessments. In fact, public documents that provide concrete examples of risk identification, 
analysis and evaluation are relatively rare. As a proxy for assessing such literature, which can 
often be kept confidential by operators, we will strive to review literature relevant to risk, 
including energy security.  
 
1.1.1 International Standards 
 
At the most general level are international institutions striving to provide a generic standard risk 
assessment methodology applicable to any system. Here the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) and the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) are instructive 
examples of institutions that provide a generic methodology with which to identify, analyse and 
evaluate risk.
1
 These standardised approaches provide a first approximation of how to approach 
risk and the steps by which a risk assessment can be conducted, regardless of the nature of the 
organization or the risks it is facing. For example, the ISO 31000 document entitled ‘Risk 
Management’ provides principles and generic guidelines on risk management, of which the 
process of risk assessment forms one part. Similarly, the IRGC released a ‘white paper’ on risk 
governance that provided an integrative approach whereby risk assessments formed part of the 
‘risk appraisal’ process, which in turn required a judgement about risk acceptability. Several 
other such general approaches exist that can provide a basis for considering best practices.
2
 
 
1.1.2 European projects on gas/energy security 
 
                                                        
1
 International Standards Organisation (ISO) 31000: 2009 at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=43170; International 
Risk Governance Council (IRGC), White Paper on Risk Governance; towards an integrative approach, 
2005 at http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_WP_No_1_Risk_Governance__reprinted_version_.pdf  
2
 See the results of the ‘desktop study’ of general RA approaches in EURACOM Deliverable 2.1; there are 
also related international approaches, such as those on asset management (e.g. PAS 55 published by the 
British Standards Institutions) that overlap with the scope of risk assessment approaches.  
1
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Moving away from general approaches to specific studies regarding the energy/gas markets, 
there is an identifiable body of literature on risk that analyses the energy system as a whole. 
Here the literature can be sub-divided between studies that are confined to one country or 
those that strive to analyse regional or international risks (with a particular emphasis on cross-
border interdependencies between systems and networks). Situated in the latter category, a 
group of 7
th
 Framework Programme projects (EURACOM, REACCESS, SECURE, as well as 
COUNTERACT and INTEGRISK
3
) endeavoured to analyse risks pertaining to the entire European 
Union, singling out in particular critical infrastructures (including entire energy networks).  
 
The target of analysis in the EURACOM project, for example, was to identify a common and 
holistic approach for risk assessment (and contingency planning) in the whole energy sector. 
This project drew extensively on the EURAM method – European Union Risk Assessment 
Method – a basic common methodology for the analysis of interdependencies between Critical 
Infrastructures (CI) of the same sectors and between CI of different sectors and different 
countries. In applying a risk assessment method to the gas system, Euracom narrowed the scope 
of analysis to transmission, which was justified “by the fact that energy grids are the pivotal 
point of dependencies and cascading effects at European scale whether we talk about 
dependencies between grids themselves or their interaction with source and distribution.”
4
 
 
The objective of the REACCESS project was to evaluate the technical, economical and 
environmental features of present and future energy corridors, within Europe and between 
Europe and the energy supplying regions of the world. This evaluation has been carried out 
through a detailed representation of the different typology of infrastructures, technologies and 
flows (thanks to a complex framework of three integrated energy system models). 
 
Focusing on the study of the potential need of developing new infrastructures in the EU gas 
transmission network, and as a result of the obligations imposed by the European 3
rd
 Energy 
Package, ENTSOG has developed two successive studies
5,6
. Both studies adopt a scenario based 
approach that helps identifying EU regions that could not have enough capacity to achieve full 
supply demand balance under specific High Demand Conditions. 
 
There are other projects, whose scope remains at the European level, which are useful as 
guideposts for determining energy-related risks. For example, the Energy Research Centre of the 
Netherlands took as their domain of analysis the EU and its member states’ energy supply 
                                                        
3
 EURACOM : European Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning Methodologies for Interconnected 
energy Networks (http://www.euracom-project.eu/ ) ; REACCESS : Risk of Energy Availability: Common 
Corridors for European Supply Security (http://reaccess.epu.ntua.gr/) ; SECURE : Security of Energy 
Considering its Uncertainty, Risk and Economic implications (http://www.secure-ec.eu/); COUNTERACT: 
Consortium Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to anti-Terrorist ACTivities; iNTeG-Risk 
- Early Recognition, Monitoring and Integrated Management of Emerging, New Technology-related Risks 
(http://www.integrisk.eu-vri.eu/)  
4
 EURACOM, Deliverable 2.3, pg. 30 
5European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). ‘European Ten Year Network 
Development Plan 2010 - 2019’. 2009. 
http://www.entsog.eu/download/investment/ENTSOG_TYNDR_B_23dec2009___.pdf   
6European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). ‘Ten-Year Network 
Development Plan 2011 - 2020’. 2011. 
http://www.gie.eu.com/adminmod/show.asp?wat=TYNDP_Report_110217_MQ.pdf  
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security.
7
 Similarly, the study analysing infrastructure projects, market integration and security 
of supply in Europe, initiated by the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), 
with the model-based analysis performed by the Institute of Energy Economics at the University 
of Cologne (EWI), provided a highly detailed description of EU gas networks in order to develop 
a European perspective on security of supply issues.
8
 A key objective of this study was the 
identification of existing and expected potential infrastructure bottlenecks. In another example, 
the World Energy Council applied vulnerability indicators to EU member states’ energy systems 
in the event of supply crises.
9
  
 
1.1.3 National Assessments of Gas Security 
 
There is much useful literature whose scope centres on specific features of national energy (or 
gas) systems. This literature can be useful for setting out the context and tools of analysis for 
considering risk. The scope and objectives of such studies tend to overlap with the steps 
necessary to conduct a risk assessment. Indeed, these studies describe the institutional 
framework, market organisation, infrastructure, and energy flows that together constitute the 
national energy system. The UK is an instructive example whereby studies adopt different scope 
conditions in their analyses. For example, a consulting report commissioned by the UK 
government focussed on the security of UK gas supply between 2010 and 2025, to assess 
options for improvement (e.g. through storage and demand side response to protect 
consumers).
10
 The system was described with a high level of granularity, detailing the drivers 
and barriers for gas infrastructure, storage and distillate backup investment in particular. A 
similar report by a different consulting group focussed on the effectiveness of current gas 
security of supply arrangements in the UK, narrowing the scope to an assessment of the costs 
related to forced outages of gas and weighing them against the cost of new gas infrastructure 
investments (particularly in the industrial sector).
11
 Finally, a study by UKERC explored ways of 
enhancing the ‘resilience’ of the UK energy system as a whole, to withstand external shocks and 
how such measures interacted with those designed to reduce carbon emissions.
12
 In each of 
these studies, the domain of analysis was different yet all were concerned with the risks posed 
to the UK national energy system.  
                                                        
7
 Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN), “EU standards for energy security of supply; updates 
on the Crisis Capability Index and the Supply/Demand Index” ECN-CIEP Joint Report, 07-004, April 2007 
at http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2007/e07004.pdf  
8
 Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI), Model-based Analysis of 
Infrastructure Projects and Market Integration in Europe with Special Focus on Security of Supply 
Scenarios, Study conducted for European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), May 2010 
9
 World Energy Council, Europe’s Vulnerability to Energy Crises, 2008 at 
http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/finalvulnerabilityofeurope2008.pdf  
10
 Poyry Consulting GB, Gas Security of Supply And Options for Improvement, a report to Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, March 2010 at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%20markets/gas_
markets/114-poyry-gb.pdf; Poyry Consulting GB, Security Of Gas Supply: European Scenarios, Policy 
Drivers And Impact On GB, A report to Department of Energy and Climate Change, June 2010b at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%20markets/gas_
markets/115-poyry-europe.pdf  
11
 Oxera, An assessment of the potential measures to improve gas security of supply, 2007, at 
http://www.oxera.com/main.aspx?id=6133  
12
 UK Energy Research Council (UKERC), Building a Resilient UK Energy System, March 2009, at 
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=618  
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1.1.4 National Gas Risk Assessments 
 
The studies of national security of supply are useful for determining the parameters to take into 
account when assessing risk. However, the studies above do not follow classical risk assessment 
methods. Their objectives, though varying, are different to the conventional process of risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation.  
 
Studies that explicitly adopt a risk assessment methodology/approach to the gas sector are not 
generally publicly available. Four exceptions are the risk assessments provided by the three 
Baltic States (in close cooperation with DG-ENER) as well as an example from the United States, 
namely the comprehensive evaluation of Alaska’s gas infrastructure conducted by two 
consulting firms.
13
 Such studies put into practice, either implicitly or explicitly, the theories and 
methods described in the general approaches to energy-related risks set out above, applying 
them to the exigencies of the natural gas sector.  
 
The Alaskan report (ARA 2009) represents a classical safety-related assessment, with the scope 
of the analysis limited to natural hazards and the technical reliability of gas networks within the 
U.S. state. The scope of the risk assessments adopted by the Baltic States is broader, considering 
the whole gas system from the total energy security point of view. Indeed, Lithuania, Estonia 
and Latvia discuss in depth their respective energy balance, considering the supply and demand 
of all available and exploited fuels within their given territory. These reports tend to discuss 
regional interdependencies such as the shared reliance on Latvia’s Incukalns Underground Gas 
Storage (UGS), and the common dependence on a single external supplier – prompting a more 
regionally-focussed scope of assessment. But there are also national differences. The Lithuanian 
Risk Assessment, for example, applied a special focus on the applicable measures to safeguard 
the district heating (DH) sector, which was the largest user of gas: in this context, Lithuania’s 
storage requirements, interruptible consumers, procedures on energy supply to consumers in 
case of extreme events, as well as demand projections up to 2020 all laid special emphasis on 
the DH sector. 
 
In risk assessments pertinent to the gas sector, the scope of analysis can be further sub-divided 
into geographical domain (e.g. EU/regional/ national/sub-national), consideration of other 
systems (e.g. oil, coal, electricity or in fact the entire energy system), and the time horizon (e.g. 
short, medium or long-term assessments). 
 
1.2 Key Concepts and Variables 
 
This review can only provide a snapshot of the huge literature attempting to analyse risks 
related to energy – and in particular natural gas – security. In the context of a classical risk 
assessment following best practices, the key question that arises in surveying the relevant 
                                                        
13
 Estonia, Risk Assessment of Estonian Gas Supply, 2010 ; Latvia, Security of Supply Risk Assessment – 
Natural Gas, 2010 ; Lithuania, Risk assessment and simulation of potential scenarios in regard to 
interruptions of natural gas supply in Lithuania, Ministry of Energy, April 2010, Alaska Risk Assessment 
(ARA), Comprehensive Evaluation and Risk Assessment of Alaska’s Oil and Gas Infrastructure; Proposed 
Risk Assessment Methodology, Doyon Emerald and ABS Consulting March 2009 at 
http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/ipp/ara/documents/Proposed%20Risk%20Assessment%20Methodology_R
ev%201.pdf   
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literature is what risks, vulnerabilities, threats and hazards are considered, and whether those 
identified are explored in terms of their causes as well as likelihoods and consequences.   
 
Rather than identifying specific risks to a given system, general approaches to risk give an 
indication of the methods by which risks can be identified and categorised. According to IRGC 
and ISO, the general methods for identifying risk range from brainstorming and check-lists to 
more formal methods such as Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) and Failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA). The HAZOP process is a qualitative technique based on the use of guide-
words which question how the design intention or operating conditions may not be achieved at 
each step of the design, process, procedure or system. FMEA is a technique used to identify the 
ways in which components, systems or processes can fail to fulfil their design intent. These are 
merely two examples of a broad range of methods used to identify risk – among others SWIFT – 
structured ‘what-if’ teams – Scenario analysis, Delphi, and so on.
14
 
 
In the literature specific to the energy system, risks tend to fall into categories. Three FP7 
Projects (REACCESS, SECURE, and EURACOM) attempted a relatively comprehensive mapping of 
the wide range of risks facing the (EU) energy system. In the case of REACCESS (Del. 4.5.1), 
factor analysis was applied to four identified ‘risk vectors’ (social, energy, political and 
economic), each of which was represented by several indicators (e.g. corruption, peace and 
conflict indicators were among those used for the ‘political’ vector). SECURE categorized risk 
according to technical, economic, regulatory, geopolitical and environmental sources (Del. 1.2). 
EURACOM promoted a holistic, all-hazards approach to identifying risk, compelling energy 
operators to consider them according to intentional, failure/accidental, natural and cascaded 
categories.  
 
Risk identification will often depend on the scope of the study, but whatever the domain of 
analysis it is important to recognize the provenance of risks (e.g. whether they are exogenous or 
endogenous to the system). In approaches that observe risk in the gas sector, risks may be of a 
different nature to those identified for oil or coal. For example, given its dependency on a single 
gas supplier, the main risks identified by Lithuania are external factors - a) gas as political 
weapon; b) political/commercial disputes (as well as long-term supply contracts) and c) 
terrorism. Of course, this does not discount the document’s consideration of other risks, such as 
natural hazards or internal technical problems, which may be of relevance. A different approach 
was adopted by the Estonian Risk Assessment, which used Delphi expert judgement and fault 
tree analysis to differentiate external from internal risks (the latter including factors such as 
vandalism, natural disasters, and technical infrastructure faults – leaks, corrosion, etc).   
 
Importantly, several approaches to classifying energy-related risks stress the importance of the 
time scale in which to consider these risks, since some are associated with shocks (e.g. sudden 
cuts in supply or hikes in price) and others with stresses (e.g. adequate long-term investment, 
geological depletion rates and so on).
15
 
 
                                                        
14
 Dalkey, N.C., “An experimental study of group opinion”, RAND Corporation Report RM-5888-PR, 
1969; see also ISO 31010 :2009, Annex A, p. 23-27 at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=51073  
15
 International Energy Agency (1995) Natural Gas Security Study. OECD/IEA, Paris, France at 
www.iea.org/textbase/nptoc/archive/Nat_Gas1995_TOC.pdf  
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The process and methods used to identify risk have an important effect on the remaining 
assessment. For example, the risk assessment conducted for the Alaskan gas sector analysed a 
comprehensive set of scenarios selected through a rigorous methodology, but the scope of the 
analysis was limited to natural hazards and the technical reliability of infrastructure (e.g. no 
market-based or geopolitical risks were considered).  
 
1.3. Tools and Methods 
 
The tools and methods used to analyse risk and related variables (security, vulnerability, 
exposure, resilience, and so on) are as numerous as they are multi-faceted. The gas system is 
characterized by a high degree of complexity (large interconnected infrastructures), uncertainty 
(wide and indeterminate causes and consequences of risk), and ambiguity (different meanings 
assigned to risk and its acceptability). Cause-effect relationships are difficult to discern and the 
high degree of variation in both causes and effects pose a problem for validation of risk 
assessments. In this case, analysis of risks will inevitably be probabilistic rather than 
deterministic.  
 
The reviewed literature identified factors that affect consequences and likelihood in different 
ways. For probability estimation and assessment of consequences either quantitative or 
qualitative methods were used. Oxera 2007 and ARA 2009 used quantitative methods for 
probability estimation, whereas the Baltic RAs applied qualitative methods. With respect to 
consequence assessment some studies used indicators/standards including N-1, others used 
formal models (e.g. EWI 2010, Poyry 2010, ARA 2009 and both REACCESS and SECURE).  
 
1.3.1 Indicators/Standards 
 
Many studies of energy security make use of indicators. Some are relatively simple expressions 
of data. For example, ‘gas import dependence’ is commonly expressed as total gas imports 
divided by total inland gas consumption.
16
 Other calculations are somewhat more complex, 
taking the form of an index. For example, the N-1 formula is expressed using a number of 
separate indicators which together describes the ability of a country to satisfy total gas demand 
in the event of disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure.
17
 This indicator, besides 
forming a standard within the framework of EC Regulation 994/2010, has been employed by the 
Baltic State Risk Assessments.  
 
Another useful index borrowed from economics is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which 
provides a measure of market concentration. In the energy sector, this index has been used to 
determine a country’s level of supply diversification (by calculating the sum of the squared 
market shares of each supplier for a given country). A similar measure found in biology, the 
Shannon–Wiener index, has also been used to determine diversity not only in imports but also in 
relation to the level of fuel mix diversification.
18
   
                                                        
16
 other simple indicators are reserves-to-production ratio (proven reserves / primary production) and 
energy intensity (TPES/GDP), see annex 2 
17
 See the annex of Regulation 994/2010. In this context, the n-1 principle refers only to gas, and therefore 
does not take into account substitution with other fuels. 
18
 ECN, Designing indicators of long-term energy supply security, ECN-C--04-007, January 2004 at 
www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2004/c04007.pdf  
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Other indices have been created specifically for the energy sector. Gnansonou and the World 
Energy Council have put forward an Energy Vulnerability Index, which is derived from the root 
mean square of five indicators (namely energy intensity, oil and gas dependency, electricity 
supply vulnerability, CO2 emission, and non-diversity in transport fuels).
19
 The Energy Research 
Centre (ECN 2007) in the Netherlands has postulated a Crisis Capability Index (CCI) as part of its 
broader attempt to provide an energy supply security standard for the EU. The CCI compares 
the values from a checklist assessing risks with a similar checklist for mitigation strategies, giving 
an overall indication of a country’s exposure to risk. ECN’s goal was to aggregate this and a 
Supply/Demand Index in order to arrive at a single energy security index. A somewhat similar 
approach has been adopted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Energy security and 
climate change
20
, followed by the report “Analysis of impacts of climate change policies on 
energy security”, developed by Ecofys for the EU.
21
 The most recent example of this approach is 
the IEA’s MOSES indicator, which restricts its scope conditions to short-term energy security and 
explicitly denies consideration of long-term factors “such as the environmental impact of 
different energy sources and systems, rapid growth in demand, and depletion of natural 
resources. With our focus on physical disruptions, MOSES also excludes economic issues related 
to affordability and volatility of energy prices.”
22
 
 
Other institutes developed more expansive indicators. For example, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce sponsored a study that used 37 metrics spread across 9 categories comprising 4 sub-
indexes that together constituted one index of U.S. energy security risk.
23
 The FP7 Project 
REACCESS used statistical methods such as regression and factor analysis to quantify a number 
of ‘risk vectors’ (social, political, energetic, and economic) that together resulted in a single 
index, to be used in the model based scenario analysis which was the core of the project.
24
  
 
Indicators form the backbone of a gas supply risk assessment. They are useful to establish the 
context/parameters of the system, in some cases they can also provide an indication of the 
vulnerabilities in the system. However, by themselves they are insufficient for performing a risk 
assessment, as they say nothing about an acceptable level of risk. Rather, their main purpose is 
to indicate to policy-makers the current state of the system by measuring inputs that can be 
considered a proxy for the potential risk and/or magnitude of an energy security impact, should 
it actually occur. Indeed, even the most sophisticated sets of indicators do not measure the 
vulnerability of the energy system, nor its resilience: they are instead measures of variables 
which are only “proxy” of the vulnerability of the system (Ecofys 2009). Still, in some cases they 
                                                        
19
 Gnansounou, E, “Assessing the energy vulnerability: Case of industrialised countries,” Energy Policy 36, 
2008, 3734–3744 at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508003510  
20
 International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Security and Climate Policy, 2007 
http://www.iea.org/publications/free_new_Desc.asp?PUBS_ID=1883  
21
 ECOFYS, Analysis of impacts of climate change policies on energy security, November 2009 at 
http://www.ecofys.nl/com/publications/brochures_newsletters/analysis_impacts_climate_change.htm  
22
 IEA, Energy Security Indicators, IEA/GB(2011)23, May 2011 
23
 Institute for 21st Century Energy, Index of U.S. Energy Security Risk; assessing America’s vulnerabilities 
in a global energy market, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2010 at www.energyxxi.org/energysecurity/ ; in 
2009 the US Energy Security Risk was 83.7 (with its highest level of 100 reached in 1980 and its lowest of 
72.6 in 1994.).  
24
 Here, the authors produced an energy risk scoring table using a sample of 158 countries (Norway scoring 
first, Afghanistan scoring last, and Mexico scoring 31st). See REACCESS Deliverable 4.5.1 
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are used as benchmarks or standards with which to gain a clearer idea of the 
vulnerability/exposure of the gas system to risk.  
 
1.3.2 Model based scenario analysis 
 
In addition to the use of indicators, studies of energy security have also employed scenario 
analysis and models to analyse risks to the gas/energy system. There are a wide range of 
models developed that can be applied to the gas system. The annex provides a detailed list of 
models and their major characteristics.
25
  
 
Several different models can be adopted: energy system models (REACCESS, SECURE, UKERC 
2010) aim to represent all the interactions between all the components of the wide energy 
system; partial equilibrium economic models of the gas market (Poyry 2010, EWI 2010) are not 
able to represent these interactions, but are more detailed with respect to some characteristics 
of the gas markets. 
 
Pöyry (2010a,b) adopted Pegasus (‘Pan-European GAS + US’) to project gas prices and flows and 
examine the interaction of supply and demand worldwide (17 European zones + US and Japan) 
on a daily basis, to estimate weekday/weekend differences, flows of interconnectors and gas 
flows in and out of storage in detail. Interconnection from GB to the Continent were modelled 
by minimising the cost of supplying gas to both zones, subject to both the capacity and the cost 
of transiting gas across the interconnectors. The major storage types were modelled accurately 
for each zone, each with its own injection and withdrawal rates, total storage capacity and cost 
of injection/withdrawal. The worldwide LNG market was modelled by considering all existing, 
under construction, proposed and conceptual LNG liquefaction projects worldwide, as well as 
LNG re-gasification terminals. Pegasus assumes perfect foresight, implying that alternative 
supplies are available when required. 
 
The TYNDP developed by ENTSOG aimed to assess the resilience of the European gas network 
through scenario development and subsequent modelling of the integrated network based on 
those scenarios. The network model is based on a simple top-down approach, using countries as 
basic building blocks interlinked by cross-border capacity (TYNDP 2011-2020). 
 
Studies that make use of models and scenarios often go beyond an assessment of the pure 
physical impact of energy supply disruptions, to find the level of risk which is “acceptable” for 
the specific system under analysis, so as to strengthen security of supply at the lowest cost. 
Often studies will assess the economic/commercial impact of supply shocks or even long-term 
stresses. For example, Poyry Consulting (2010 a/b) first estimate the probabilities of unserved 
energy in a wide number of situations, then estimate the “economic impact” of a loss of load by 
using as a proxy for the effect of unserved energy the impact to GVA (gross value added) of the 
above unserved energy volumes; by multiplying this cost through the probability of each 
scenario, they eventually convert this to an “expected annual average cost”. Similarly, UKERC 
(2010) starts from a range of scenarios with different degree of resilience to simulate possible 
shocks to the UK energy system that impact on gas supply facilities; they estimate the impact of 
these shocks in terms of energy unserved (mcm), value of energy unserved (£m) and change in 
                                                        
25
 SECURE used “Poles”, UKERC 2010 used “Markal-Med”, “WASP”, “CGEN”; JRC uses “GemFLOW”, 
“SynerGEE”; Poyry uses “Pegasus”.  
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system operating costs (£m); as a last step, they assess how system costs and welfare costs 
change in moving from the Reference and Low-Carbon scenarios to the Resilient and Low-
Carbon Resilient scenarios respectively. Finally, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB - 2006) assessed the costs and benefits of a set of possible security of supply 
measures against a baseline “disturbance-free” scenario; the benefits in particular were 
measured though the costs incurred by a disruption: partial-equilibrium energy market models 
were used to assess direct effects of disturbances within energy supply on energy demand and 
prices, while the indirect, macroeconomic consequences are analysed using Athena, a dynamic 
multisector model for the Dutch economy.
26
 
 
1.4 Results and Outcomes 
 
Outputs from the risk assessments of the natural gas sector commonly provide risk matrices 
(see section 3.2.3.1). For example, all three Baltic state RAs presented the acceptability of the 
various risks posed to their respective gas systems using 3x3 or 4x4 risk matrices. Similarly, ARA 
2009 provided a 5x3 risk matrix for reliability consequences, presenting it as loss of revenue to 
the State due to production losses. In addition, this report drew on risk histograms and 
summaries, the latter showing percentages of safety and reliability risk based on characteristics 
of identified scenarios.  
 
In addition to these classical risk evaluation tools, some reports present an assessment of 
alternative possible energy security strategies, albeit using different variables and providing 
different outputs in relation to their scope. Basically, their aim was to compare the economic 
impact of supply interruptions with the benefits of possible security measures. For example, 
Oxera’s cost-benefit analysis was an assessment of the alternative measures to increase 
security, based on their cost of implementation and the expected costs of forced outages 
(calculated as sum of probability of interruption times cost). Alternatively, Poyry’s analysis 
assessed a list of possible options, by estimating the reduced cost of expected demand loss (and 
its net present value) produced by the implementation of these measures, as well as the 
implementation and investment costs of these measures. The Dutch CPB report presented a 
cost-benefit analysis of two policy options, computing break even frequencies to assess the 
expected efficiency of these options.  
 
1.5 Conclusion of the literature review 
 
This review has demonstrated that a great deal of variety exists in the recent literature assessing 
security of gas supply, at national or regional level. Most of the reports reviewed in practice do 
not follow internationally-recognised approaches such as those found in ISO or IRGC. In fact, 
they do not explicitly call themselves risk assessment, and are therefore not concerned with a 
rigorous methodology for assessing risk. Often they have a narrow purpose, such as assessing 
the current state of the energy system (but not assigning likelihoods or probabilities to possible 
contingencies) or evaluating the potential for enhancing energy security (by undertaking cost-
benefit analysis).  
 
                                                        
26
 Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), Energy policies and risks on energy markets; 
a cost-benefit analysis, Centraal Planbureau, 2006 at http://www.cpb.nl/node/10223  
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Nonetheless, the literature reviewed, even if often far from a standard RA methodology, can still 
be very useful. As a matter of fact, in many cases single components of most of the reviewed 
studies are closely related to a risk assessment methodology, sometimes employing some of the 
same tools and methods. They can therefore be used as good practices that can be replicated to 
carry out the specific steps of a proper RA. 
 
The eclectic nature of the literature reviewed is a natural product of the ambiguity surrounding 
the concept of ‘risk’ and ‘energy security.’
27
 But this is not just a semantic squabble: the 
definition of the system/parameters and the identification of risks that are to be analyzed affect 
not only the outcome of the Risk Assessment but also the risk mitigation strategies (in the case 
of Regulation 994/2010 – the emergency/preventive plans).  
 
The main lesson to draw from this literature review is that it is very important to have a 
methodology that clearly identifies the system under consideration, the specific risks affecting 
this system, and the criteria for assessing them (e.g. measure of damage, 
likelihood/consequences). Therefore, regardless of the variety of approaches, the main, 
essential components of any risk assessment that cannot be ignored is a) establishing 
scope/context, b) identifying risks, c) identifying probabilities/likelihoods, d) assessing 
consequences/impacts, e) and evaluating risks. 
 
                                                        
27
 for a discussion of the problems in defining energy security, see Chester, L, “Conceptualising energy 
security and making explicit its polysemic nature,” Energy Policy, Vol. 38, 2010, pp. 887-895. For an 
academic discussion of the concept of risk see Aven, T, “Misconceptions of Risk”, Wiley, 2010                                                                   
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Objectives of the Practical Guidelines 
for the Risk Assessment 
 
 
 
Regulation 994/2010 requires member states to carry out a Risk Assessment, but it does not 
provide a specific methodology for performing it. Still, in order to be able to formulate a 
coherent picture about the risks related to security of gas supply on a regional and on a 
European level, the outputs of the national assessments need to be consistent and comparable 
with each other and should be based on similar criteria for examining threats and hazards.  
 
Here, an “inverse decision-based” approach is proposed to select the methodology to be 
adopted. In other words, the Risk Assessment methodology can only be identified after 
 
a) the objective of the risk assessment has been clearly defined; 
b) the elements of the system that must be considered to address this objective in a rigorous 
way have been identified. 
 
The Table below extracts five key aims apparent in both the Regulation and its accompanying 
documents.  
 
Table 1 – Classification of the aims of the Regulation: 
 
Sufficient supply of gas (physical security) 
Solidarity and coordination at regional level 
Economic approach to security 
Establishing a clear framework of roles and 
responsibilities of the different actors 
Environmental concerns 
 
The key message coming from table 1 is that the Regulation can be synthesised through five 
main aims. The first three have a direct impact on the issues that must be addressed in the 
national Risk Assessments: 
 
1. Sufficient supply of gas (physical security). Both Regulation 994/2010 and the previous 
Impact Assessment state clearly that their main goal is to establish an institutional 
framework to ensure a sufficient continuous supply of natural gas, particularly in case of 
difficult climatic conditions and in the event of disruption. The view behind this 
“physical” approach to gas security, which is somewhat independent from the 
“economically” optimal level of security (specific to each country / region), is that the 
weaknesses made evident in the January 2009 gas crisis must be tackled as soon as 
possible. 
2
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2. Solidarity and coordination at regional level. Regulation 994/2010 acknowledges one of 
the outcomes of the public consultation on the revision of the 2004 Directive, showing 
wide consensus amongst EU institutions about the need for cooperation at regional 
level: recent experience has demonstrated that there is a clear risk that measures 
developed unilaterally by a Member State may jeopardise the proper functioning of the 
internal gas market and the supply of gas to customers. Certain national emergency 
measures may in fact lower the level of security of supply in another Member State. 
Such actions should be avoided. Therefore, it is necessary to provide for solidarity and 
coordination in mapping the possible risks on national and regional level and preparing 
prevention and response mechanisms to supply crises. 
3. Economic approach to security. Throughout the whole Regulation it is repeated several 
times that the internal gas market and effective competition within that market offer 
the Union the highest level of security of supply for all Member States, provided that 
the market is allowed to function fully in the event of disruption of supply affecting a 
part of the Union. Strictly related to this view, the need for a general economic 
approach to gas security is often stated:  
- security of gas supply must be strengthened at the lowest cost, without imposing 
unreasonable and disproportionate burdens on natural gas undertakings; 
- the ultimate goal is to avoid a disruption of gas supply that can have a “severe social 
impact”, which is not necessarily highly correlated with the uninterrupted physical 
quantity of gas entering into the system. This means that the question is more to 
find the country/region specific “acceptable” level of risk.  
 
Two further aims can be identified in the Regulation, with an important impact on the issues 
that must be addressed in the Risk Assessments:  
 
4. Establishing a clear framework of roles and responsibilities of the different actors. The 
Regulation asks each Member State to designate a Competent Authority that ensures 
the implementation of the measures. The list of Competent Authorities shall be public, 
therefore it will be clear which authority or body is responsible in a certain Member 
State. The Regulation reiterates that natural gas undertakings should be given 
opportunity to tackle the negative consequences of a disruption as long as possible. 
5. Environmental concerns. Two articles of the Regulation state that the environmental 
impact of the proposed demand and supply-side measures (in the National and joint 
Preventive Action Plans) should be taken into due account. And preference should be 
given as far as possible to measures with the least impact on the environment. 
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Proposed Risk Assessment framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Assessment has been developed along the last decades until becoming a mature subject in 
the scientific and technical literature. Thanks to that degree of maturity, the scientific and 
technical community has been able to develop standards which provide an adequate framework 
to perform structured Risk Assessment studies, most remarkably ISO 31000. In addition to this 
key reference, the ISO 31010 develops further, in much more detail than ISO 31000, the 
components of Risk Assessment. Moreover, ISO Guide 73 contains the definitions for the most 
frequently used terms in Risk Management. These two standards and the mentioned guide have 
been taken as the main elements to propose a RA structure to implement the requirements in 
Article 9 of EC Regulation 994/2010. 
 
According to ISO 31000 (see annex 1 for a short summary) and IEC/ISO 31010, “Risk 
Assessment” is at the core of “Risk Management”, preceded by the ‘Establishing the context’ 
step and followed by “Risk Treatment:” 
 
ISO International Standard Risk Management Framework 
 
 
3
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Basically, a Risk Management process involves understanding the system under study, assessing 
its associated risk, designing strategies / treatments to reduce the risk and making decisions 
about the adequate strategy to adopt (including the option of avoiding any action oriented to 
reducing the risk). The step addressed in this document is the Risk Assessment. Nevertheless, 
establishing the context is a mandatory and unavoidable step that contributes important inputs 
to the Risk Assessment. Risk Treatment is closely related to the preventive action plan, which 
will be dealt with in another document. 
 
The next two sub-sections address respectively the ‘Establishing the context’ phase and the Risk 
Assessment.  
 
3.1 Establishing the context 
 
According to ISO 31000 (2009),  
 
“By establishing the context, the organization articulates its objectives, defines the external and 
internal parameters to be taken into account when managing risk, and sets the scope and the 
risk criteria for the remaining process” 
 
Establishing the context involves a set of activities related to setting the global process. 
Particularly it involves understanding the reasons to perform the Risk Assessment (e.g. adhering 
to the Regulation), all the parties involved in the process, the relations among them and the 
responsibilities, the decision making process and many other organisational tasks. Nevertheless, 
two key components of ‘establishing the context’ must be stressed: the characterisation of the 
system and the definition of Risk Criteria. Both subjects are dealt with in the next two 
subsections. 
 
3.1.1 Parameters of the national gas system 
 
The EC gas regulation calls for national and regional Risk Assessments. The scope of the Risk 
Assessment includes all the components of the natural gas supply chain. The following “relevant 
characteristics of the gas system” (Article 9) can be analyzed according to a sub-group of 
data/indicators which help to define the structure and parameters of the system. This 
information can be used as a proxy for determining the level of risk/exposure to supply 
disruptions. Annex 2 provides a more detailed discussion of some of the data listed below, and 
also presents a method for calculating aspects such as diversification, import dependence, or 
storage capabilities. Broadly, the parameters of the gas system can be categorised according to 
(a) market aspects; (b) infrastructure; (c) utilization and contracts; (d) the institutional 
framework; and (e) the regional context. 
 
Following best practices, the categories below provide a list of some key elements that are 
taken into account when assessing risk in the national gas system.  
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A) Market____________________________________________________________ 
The following list of market-related factors is not exhaustive; it only refers to those elements of 
the market that affects or is relevant to the Risk Assessment. Both sides of the market are 
considered – demand and supply. 
Demand Supply 
(average/monthly/peak/seasonal) 
Current and projected gas demand (up to 
2020) 
Demand of transformation sector 
Total final gas consumption (by sector - 
industry, transport, residential, district 
heating, power generation and 
commercial) and role of gas in the 
different sectors 
Current and projected gas demand in 
primary energy mix 
Demand from interruptible/protected 
customers/district heating, average and 
peak day consumption (1-in-2, 1-in-20, 1 
day, 7 days, exceptionally high gas 
demand throughout a longer period) 
Voluntary/enforced firm load shedding 
Level of market opening (proportion of 
wholesale/retail market open to 
competition
28
) 
Customer fuel switching capabilities, e.g. 
distillate backup for CCGT (industry, 
tertiary, household), alternative 
(obligatory) fuel stocks of certain 
consumers 
Proportion of protected customers in total 
gas consumption 
Gas prices for industry and power 
generation (regulation, evolution & 
volatility)  
Gas prices for households (regulation, 
evolution) 
Number/capacity of gas-fired power 
plants 
Age/maintenance of conversion facilities 
 
Current and projected gas supply (in the 
context of TPES) 
Total production 
Total imports (+ number of import sources) 
Total exports 
Gas quality (calorific value) 
Number and market share of major energy 
firms 
Level of supply diversification (can be 
expressed using Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, see annex 2) 
Level and possibilities of cross-border 
flows/trading (contractual, physical 
bottlenecks) 
IGAs, long-term contracts 
Number of suppliers, importers, TSOs, 
market concentration 
 
                                                        
28
 Again, the HHI index or an equivalent indicator could be used, see Lewiner, C, ed., “European energy 
markets observatory”, Capgemini, 10th Edition, November 2008, p. 50 at 
http://www.capgemini.com/m/en/doc/0811_EEMO10_FullReportEN_corrections.pdf  
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Market description in the literature 
Poyry 2010a (ch. 2 and 3) and Lithuania RA (ch. 2) are examples of descriptions of the current market 
situation at national level in terms of gas supply and demand, both current and projected (medium/long-
term), with a good level of granularity: indigenous production, annual and peak demand at sectoral level, 
demand profile (Poyry 2010a/b), flexibility of the system in the event of a shortage (distillate backup and 
industrial and commercial demand side response could be utilised, with explicit assumptions on the 
market’s potential for demand side response). 
In most of the studies based on models a similar detailed description of the national/EU gas market is not 
explicit, but implicit in the modelisation of the gas market (or taken from external public sources, like 
IEA). 
 
B) Gas infrastructure____________________________________________________ 
Gas infrastructure refers to the physical infrastructure in place to produce, import, process, 
transmit, and distribute gas (here ‘capacity’ rather than ‘flows’ should be taken into account). 
Gas infrastructure includes the gas transmission network including interconnectors as well as 
production, LNG, storage, transformation and distribution facilities.  
 
Pipelines 
 
Number of border 
transmission entry and exit 
points (pipelines) 
Maximal technical capacity 
of entry points (+ their 
country of origin) 
Physical bi-directional 
capacity (by pipeline) 
Number of compressor 
stations along transmission 
lines
29
 
Number of gas metering 
stations 
Control stations and SCADA 
systems (+backup) 
Planned investments
30
  
Age/maintenance of 
pipelines
31
 
Internal bottlenecks, other 
upgrading needs in the 
national transmission 
system 
LNG 
 
Import capacity of LNG 
facilities 
Maximal technical LNG 
processing capacity 
(maximum sustainable 
send-out capacity) 
Number of LNG 
facilities
32
 
Cross border LNG 
capacity/commitments 
Planned investments 
Age/maintenance of 
LNG facilities  
 
Storage 
 
Maximal technical 
storage deliverability 
(withdrawal rate) 
Maximal working gas 
capacity 
Physical characteristics 
of storage sites 
(number/type – e.g. 
base load/peak load 
ratio) – short/long-term 
storages 
Cross border storage 
capacity/commitments 
Planned investments (+ 
age/maintenance of 
storage facilities)  
 
Production 
 
Maximal technical 
production capability 
Reserves to 
production ratio 
Number/type of 
production facilities
33
 
Planned investments 
Age/maintenance of 
production facilities 
 
                                                        
29
 This also provides an approximation of the total length of transmission lines; if possible, the energy 
source for the compressor station should be provided 
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Infrastructure description in the literature 
The Alaska Risk Assessment (ARA) project, whose focus is on the safety of infrastructures, includes a very 
detailed description of the gas and oil regional infrastructure (ch 4). Even though less technically 
comprehensive than the Alaskan report, the technical details included by Poyry 2010a, Lithuania RA 
(national level) and EWI (EU level) describe all the current and projected physical supply infrastructures: 
production, storage, pipelines and interconnectors, LNG. In the remaining studies based on gas models 
the description of national/EU gas infrastructures is included in the models. The ENTSOG European Ten 
Year Network Development Plans (for 2010-2019 and 2011-2020) are among the public sources often 
used for projected infrastructures. 
 
 
C) Infrastructure utilization and contracts___________________________________ 
 
C.1) Utilization 
Utilization relates to the volume and direction of gas supplies flowing throughout the system. 
Utilization differs according to different time periods (e.g. peak/seasonal/daily demand). 
 
 
Pipelines 
 
Annual/peak incoming 
and outgoing flows  
Annual/peak reverse 
flows 
Annual/peak utilization 
rate (for each pipeline – 
bottlenecks can be 
identified 
LNG 
 
Annual/peak import 
flows from LNG 
terminals 
 
Annual/peak send-out 
flows of LNG 
Annual/peak utilization 
rate (for each LNG 
terminal) 
 
Storage 
 
Annual/peak volume of 
stocks 
Annual/peak 
withdrawal rate 
Annual/peak utilization 
rate 
 
Production 
 
Annual/peak production  
Remaining resources, 
unconventional 
resources 
Actual gas reserves 
Depletion rate 
 
 
C.2) Contracts 
Supply contracts are an integral part of determining the gas system’s flexibility. The duration, 
type and exact terms of contracts should be taken into account. For pipelines, LNG, storage and 
production, the following should be taken into account: 
 
• Number and type of contracts (long-term, short term, swap, use of spot market, volume 
of each) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
30
 Planned investments should be assessed in line with ENTSO-G’s Ten Year Network Development Plan 
(TYNDP) and should generally include those that are past the technical feasibility/planning phase and have 
been allocated financing and a timetable for construction 
31
 Maintenance could be expressed as the number of technical inspections (e.g. PiG runs in the case of 
pipelines) or the average number/cost of repairs. 
32
 Facilities include tankers, import terminals, regasification facilities and so on 
33
 Can be divided between offshore/onshore sites 
   
 23 
• Trading
34
 
• Flexibility/Liquidity
35
 
 
D) Institutional framework_____________________________________________________ 
 
In undertaking the risk assessment it is important to make a list of all the relevant stakeholders 
and the rules governing their activities. This is useful not only in identifying risk but also in being 
able to better manage unforeseen disruptions to supply (an integral part of the 
emergency/action plans).  
 
• Stakeholders (e.g. competent authorities, interest groups, government ministries, 
energy firms, etc.) 
• Roles and responsibilities (in addition to setting out the degree of adherence to the EU’s 
‘three-level’ approach to supply disruption management – market, national, then 
European response – member states are encouraged to specify whether TSOs have a 
system in place for coordinated dispatching in the event of a disruption).   
• Regulatory framework (e.g. the institutions and rules governing relations between 
stakeholders) 
• Legal arrangements for security of gas supply (Emergency provisions, disconnection 
order, enforced storage/stock capacity/withdrawal) 
• Level of unbundling (legal, organizational) 
Institutional framework description in the literature 
Poyry (2010a, ch. 2 and 3) describes the regulatory regime for distillate backup capacity at power 
generation and industrial and commercial interruptible load. It also describes the investment drivers and 
barriers for gas infrastructure, storage and distillate backup investment in particular. RA of Lithuania 
(2010, sections 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5) describes the regulation of the gas sector, with special focus on the 
applicable measures to safeguard supply security: storage requirements, interruptible consumers, 
procedures on energy supply to consumers in case of extreme events. 
In the studies based on gas models the description of national/EU institutional context is embedded into 
the models. However, most models assume efficient markets, implying that technically available capacity 
and alternative supplies are available when required. 
 
E) Regional context__________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                        
34
 Trading refers to how gas is exchanged (e.g. through financial/physical market) and is affected by market 
liquidity, level of commodity trading versus bilateral market contracting, pricing through hub-trading, 
regulation or indexation, and so on. For a recent article on pricing developments in Europe, see Stern, J and 
Rogers, H, "The transition to hub-based gas pricing in continental Europe", Working Paper Energy 
Economics, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March 2011 at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2011/03/the-
transition-to-hub-based-gas-pricing-in-continental-europe/   
35
 Flexibility refers to the ease with which contracted flows can be increased or decreased due to 
externalities (and it is crucially linked to the physical spare capacity of pipelines).  
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In addition to some of the cross-border data considered above (e.g. entry/exit points on 
pipelines, LNG, reverse flows, shared storage, etc), some additional cooperative instruments on 
a regional level should be considered in undertaking risk assessment: 
 
• Describing existing cooperation mechanisms among TSOs (including planned cross-
border investments) 
• Regional emergency exercises 
• Regional N-1  
  
3.1.2 Establishing Risk Criteria 
 
Establishing Risk Criteria means setting limits that help in determining whether the system is 
exposed to an either unacceptable or to an acceptable risk level. Risk criteria involve the two 
components of risk: likelihood (also referred to as ‘probability’) and damage (also referred to as 
‘impact’ or ‘consequences’); see section 3.2. The Regulation does not mention explicitly what 
the measure of damage should be in undertaking a risk assessment, but it stresses the 
importance of supplying gas to ‘Protected Customers’. Particularly, the RA (article 9a) needs to 
apply the standards specified in Article 6 (the ‘Infrastructure Standard’) and Article 8 (the 
‘Supply Standard’). These standards, which can be calculated using the data provided above, can 
be used as minimum acceptable risk criteria: 
 
• The Infrastructure Standard is based on the N-1 formula. It is used to indicate the ability 
of the gas system to cope with the disruption of the largest gas infrastructure.  
• The Supply Standard stipulates that gas supply needs to be ensured for protected 
customers in the event of several cases:  
a) extreme temperatures during a seven-day peak period,  
b) any period of at least 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, and  
c) for a period of at least 30 days in the case of the n-1 scenario during average winter 
conditions. 
 
All this bring us to suggest three different, although closely related, possible measures of 
damage/impact 
• Non-supplied gas to protected customers (evolution over time), 
• Time during which the lack of gas supply persists, and 
• Total non-supplied gas to customers (integral of the first one over time) 
 
Based on these measures of damage/impact, and taking into account pertinent likelihoods, MS 
may define their respective risk criteria. 
 
Nevertheless this is not the only set of measures of damage/impact that can be considered. 
According to the analysis shown in section 2, if a particular MS decides to take into 
consideration economic/financial potential damages, other measures of damage may be defined 
and used to set Risk Criteria. An economic approach is in fact adopted also by Regulation 
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994/2010, and by many scientific studies as well: to strengthen security of supply at the lowest 
cost, the goal is to find the level of risk which is “acceptable” for the specific system under 
analysis.  
Poyry (2010a,b), UKERC (2010), CPB (2006), Oxera (2007) carry out cost/benefit analyses of 
possible options to reduce the cost of insecurity, by comparing the economic impact of supply 
interruptions and the benefits of possible security measures. 
Risk Criteria in the literature 
Two main approaches to risk criteria can be identified, one focusing on "rigid" standards to secure 
physical flows of gas, another  one following a more flexible economic approach: 
A) Standards, like the Infrastructure Standard and the Supply Standard established in Regulation 
994/2010, can be used as minimum acceptable risk criteria.  
• All the three Baltic State risk assessments (Estonia RA, Latvia RA and Lithuanian RA) include a 
transparent description of the calculation of the N-1 constituents. The result is that Latvia is well 
above the threshold of 100%, while Estonia and Lithuania fall short of it, with Estonia being able to 
fulfil the requirement if only the gas demand of the protected customers is considered.  
• The calculation of standards, if apparently straightforward, requires in fact a clear definition of the 
meanings of its constituents. An example is the calculation of the Supply standard established by 
Regulation 994/2010, for which some key variables, like for instance the “extreme temperatures 
during a 7-day peak period”, need a clear definition. 
B) Three examples of quantitative assessments based on economic risk criteria are the following: 
• Poyry (2010a,b) establish as a benchmark for the assessment the “expected annual average cost of 
energy unserved”. After estimating the probabilities of unserved energy in a wide number of 
situations (mainly different gas demand and supply levels), the “economic impact” of a loss of load is 
estimated through the impact to GVA (Gross Value Added) of the unserved energy volumes.  
• Oxera (2007) and CPB (2006) follow a different approach: instead of establishing a threshold for a 
selected variable, they carry out cost/benefit analyses of possible alternative measures to reduce the 
cost of insecurity, by comparing the economic impact of supply interruptions and the benefits of 
possible security measures:  
• Oxera compares alternative options to increase security based on their cost of implementation 
and the expected costs of forced outages (calculated as sum of probability of interruption times 
cost); 
• in CPB (2006) the benefits of possible security measures (estimated through an energy market 
model) are measured though the costs incurred by a disruption; but as the expected efficiency 
of policies depends on the expected probability of uncertain future events which are nearly 
impossible to determine, “break event frequencies” are calculated for each security measures. 
An interesting common result of these different studies based on an economic approach to security 
of gas supply is that the possible options to increase the security of supply are rarely found cost-
efficient. 
A last further option to establish risk criteria is based on the use of indicators (ECN, IEA/Ecofys), whose 
aim is representing through just one or few figures the "diversity" of the energy system, a proxy for the 
expected impact of a crisis both in terms of physical flows and economic costs. 
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3.2 Risk Assessment 
 
The word ‘risk’ has already been used several times in this document, but no formal definition 
has been provided so far. Quite frequently, risk is defined as probability times damage (or 
impact, or consequences, see fourth column in the table in Annex 5). Essentially this means that 
a measure of risk has to account for potential consequences and weigh them with their 
corresponding probabilities (likelihoods). In the following paragraphs another more operational 
definition of risk will be shown. 
 
ISO 31010 indicates that Risk Assessments attempt to answer the following fundamental 
questions: 
 
• What can happen and why? 
• What are the consequences? 
• What is the probability of its future occurrence? 
 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) showed that a formal answer to these three questions requires 
describing risk through the use of a set of triplets
36
: 
 
{ , , }i i iR s yϕ= < >     .,...,2,1 Ni = ,   (1) 
where  
1. i
s
 represents scenario i in the set of N scenarios considered. 
2. iϕ is the probability of scenario i. 
3. iy is the potential consequence under the conditions of scenario i. 
This constitutes a formal mathematical definition of risk, although it does not account for all 
sources of uncertainty (for a more detailed definition that accounts for all sources of uncertainty 
see annex 3). Under this definition each scenario is characterised by its probability and its 
consequence(s) (one or several consequence variables may be considered, but only one possible 
value of each consequence variable is considered). Adopting this definition of Risk means that all 
possible scenarios must be identified and the probability of each must be estimated. Moreover, 
for each scenario, the consequence(s) for the system must be assessed. In order to do all these 
tasks, ISO 31000 and IEC/ISO 31010 divide the Risk Assessment in the following three steps: 
 
• Risks identification 
• Risk analysis 
• Risk evaluation 
 
                                                        
36
 Kaplan S, Garrick BJ. “On the quantitative definition of risk”. Risk Analysis; 1(1), 1981: 11-27 
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1981.tb01350.x/abstract  
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The following sections will describe these steps in the context of the Regulation’s requirements. 
3.2.1 Risk identification 
 
According to ISO 31000, 
 
“The organization should identify sources of risk, areas of impacts, events (including changes in 
circumstances) and their causes and their potential consequences. The aim of this step is to 
generate a comprehensive list of risks based on those events that might create, enhance, 
prevent, degrade, accelerate or delay the achievement of objectives.” (ISO 31000, pg. 17) 
 
The set{ } 1,...,i i Ns = considered in the definition of risk must contain all possible scenarios, which 
means all possible system contingencies – in terms of a physical loss of gas supply as well as the 
various technical, political, economic and natural factors associated with this contingency (as 
either causes or consequences thereof). In other words, the set of scenarios should be 
exhaustive. Additionally, the scenarios must be mutually exclusive; the occurrence of one of 
them precludes the occurrence of any other one. Fulfilling both conditions means that the 
addition of the probabilities of all scenarios is 1. In principle, the most likely situation is that the 
gas system undergoes either no perturbation or small perturbations that do not prevent it to 
perform the assigned tasks. This would be the normal evolution scenario. In addition to the 
normal evolution scenario, the really important scenarios have to be identified: scenarios with 
non-negligible probability and non-negligible consequences. The scenarios considered may span 
a wide range of different circumstances, from technical failures in the physical pipeline network 
to political problems or even policy or market failures. 
The first task to design an adequate set of scenarios is the identification of all possible sources of 
risk (Risk Identification). This is a very important task because missing some relevant source of 
risk may produce a lack of exhaustiveness in the set of scenarios and therefore may lead to risk 
underestimation.  
Several risk identification techniques exist in the literature. IEC/ISO 31010 provides a detailed 
overview and a comparison of risk identification techniques. In particular, the authors of this 
report consider the following techniques as the most suited to deal with risk identification in the 
gas sector: 
 
a) brainstorming 
b) structured or semi structured interviews 
c) check lists 
d) Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) 
e) Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 
 
Annex 4 provides a short description of each one, highlighting their main characteristics, when 
they are most useful, the types of inputs needed and outputs obtainable, and the most 
remarkable strengths and limitations. 
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A useful starting point in any risk identification technique is to condense and classify all the 
possible sources of risk. The relevance of a classification rests on two factors: it helps thinking on 
sources of risk that share some commonalities, making thorough risk identification more likely 
and, usually, it helps to realise that each category of risk requires a different analytical approach.  
A basic and classical categorisation of sources of risk consists in classifying them as intentional 
and non-intentional. Sources of risk that belong to the former category are called ‘threats’, 
while those that belong to the latter are called ‘hazards’. Another possible categorisation 
attending to the origin of the sources of risk is: 
 
1. Technical  
a. Hazards (e.g. unintentional failure of infrastructure, ICT breakdown) 
b. Threats (e.g. intentional sabotage/attack) 
2. Political  
a. Hazards (e.g. civil unrest, war) 
b. Threats (e.g. targeted attacks on gas infrastructure, strikes) 
3. Economic 
a. Hazards (e.g. gas price volatility) 
      b. Threats (e.g. commercial dispute, monopolization of market) 
4. Environmental (e.g. natural hazards) 
a. Hazards (e.g. hurricane, earthquake, flood, landslide, etc.) 
An alternative categorisation of sources of risk is the one suggested in the EC FP-7 research 
project EURACOM, which considered four major categories: intent, failure, nature and cascade 
(see table 2 to find sources of risk in each category). 
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Table 2 – Categorisation of sources of risk according to EURACOM project; EURACOM, Del. 2.3. 
 
 
Another useful approach to classify sources of risk is according to their temporality (e.g. a 
sudden, short-term shock or a long-term stress) and to their provenance (internal or external), 
as well as according to their physical or price implications.  
 
Transient shocks can be differentiated from more enduring stresses. Each of them may originate 
either inside or outside any given construction of the gas system (Scoones et al. 2007, Stirling 
2009). The distinction is of importance because the strategies for maintaining the gas system 
may be very different for each case. An alternative denomination for shock is event, while an 
alternative denomination for stress is process. 
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Fig. 1 - Dynamic system properties – across time (temporality) and origin (provenance) 
 
It is useful to differentiate an event with a prevailing price component from an event with a 
prevailing physical component:  
o the former is more relevant in markets where prices are allowed to adjust in 
response to changes in demand and supply, so that the risk of physical 
unavailability is reduced to extreme events; the prevailing energy security 
concern is related to prices not set competitively or overly volatile; the 
international oil and coal markets can be included in this category (IEA 2007); 
o on the contrary, physical unavailability is the main concern in markets where 
prices are regulated or pegged on other commodities, so that price movements 
cannot contribute to balance supply and demand; the gas markets in most 
European countries fall in this category (IEA 2007). 
 
The final output of the Risk Identification phase should be a comprehensive list of events and 
processes that may push the system to undesired consequences. Ideally, each term in the list 
should be accompanied by a set of potential effects on the system. It is also of interest to 
identify for each event or process what other elements of the list could be affected by its 
occurrence (either by modifying its probability of occurrence or by affecting the potential 
consequences). 
 
 
Risk identification in the literature 
SECURE (Checchi et al 2009
37
) is an example of a relatively comprehensive description/mapping of the 
wide range of risks facing the EU energy system, considering technical, (geo)political, economic, 
geological and natural/environmental risks. The study includes both short-term shocks and long-term 
enduring shifts.  
                                                        
37
 Checchi, A; Behrens, A; Egenhofer, C, “Long-term energy security risks for Europe; a sector-specific 
approach”, CEPS Working Document, No. 309, January 2009 at http://www.ceps.eu/book/long-term-
energy-security-risks-europe-sector-specific-approach  
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REACCESS (2008) identifies and categorizes risks on the base of a historical description of all the short-
term shocks materialized in the global energy markets during the last sixty years.  
ECN (2007) also proposes a check-list system for identifying risks, breaking them down in terms of the 
part of the supply chain in which they appear. 
National studies, like the RA of the Baltic states and Poyry (2010b, ch. 4) select the risks considered more 
significant for the country, on the base of a discussion of their gas systems. They focus mainly on short-
term shocks, considering both risks coming from inside the national gas system and external risks.  
Some studies take risks as a given, building them into their assessment of probabilities of contingencies 
or failures. For example, Oxera (2007) models risks as the annual probability of a) operational outages, b) 
outages of transit routes, of terminals capacity, c) of capacity storage, that are independent to the 
specific sources of risks. 
ARA (2009) divides the system into nodes and considers a comprehensive list of technical failures and 
natural hazards that can affect each node. These events (failures and hazards) are screened according to 
their probability occurrence and potential consequences to the whole system.   
 
 
3.2.2 Risk Analysis 
 
According to ISO 31000 
 
“Risk analysis involves consideration of the causes and sources of risk, their positive and negative 
consequences, and the likelihood that those consequences can occur. Factors that affect 
consequences and likelihood should be identified.” 
 
The objective of the risk analysis is to formally define scenarios as combinations of the identified 
events or processes (the whole range of hazards and threats; shocks and stresses) that may 
jeopardise the correct system performance, estimate their likelihoods and assess the 
consequences under the conditions of each scenario, either in terms of non-delivered gas to 
protected customers, or in terms of any other undesired effect. In addition to these typical 
elements of a formal Risk Analysis, and according to article 9 of the Regulation, the results of the 
Infrastructure Standard (article 6) and of the Supply Standard (article 8) must also be included. 
Correlated risks with other MS must be identified. These may be further elaborated in a 
Regional Risk Assessment. Finally, the risk associated to the system may evolve over time. It is of 
interest to study that evolution considering different time frames. It is to be noted that the Risk 
Assessment should be updated every two years. The following subsections are dedicated to 
these subjects. 
 
3.2.2.1. Formal Risk Analysis 
 
A formal Risk Analysis may be structured in three phases: 
 
• Scenarios definition 
• Probability/likelihood estimation 
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• Consequences assessment 
 
A) Scenarios definition
38
_________________________________________________ 
 
As already mentioned elsewhere, the set of scenarios should be exhaustive (cover all possible 
system contingencies) and mutually exclusive (the occurrence of one of them precludes the 
occurrence of any other one). Each scenario is a meaningful combination of events and/or 
processes (the combination includes also the case of only one event or process), together with a 
set boundary conditions, that has non-negligible probability and/or consequences.  
From a practical point of view, the number of scenarios that should undergo rigorous analysis 
should be relatively small. Each selected scenario must be representative of a set of scenarios 
that produce similar consequences. The probability of each selected scenario must account for 
all the non-addressed scenarios that it represents. 
Scenarios definition is basically based on Expert Judgement, although in some technology areas 
the use of event trees for this task is widespread (see annex 9). The starting point is the set of 
events and processes selected in the risk identification phase. Probabilities of occurrence and 
expected consequences must be taken into account in the construction of scenarios. Defining 
thresholds on probabilities and potential consequences may be of help to screen out scenarios 
that do not contribute significantly to the total system risk.  
The result of this phase is a list of scenarios with their respective probabilities. Each scenario 
should be accompanied by a clear and detailed description that involves all assumptions and 
boundary conditions considered in its definition.  
 
Scenario definition in the literature 
A basic problem of any scenario definition is the difficulty in attaching a probability to each scenario.  
ARA (2009) is the only example of an attempt to compile a comprehensive set of scenarios selected 
through a rigorous methodology (fault trees and event trees). This is due to the more narrow scope of the 
analysis, limited to infrastructures.  
On the contrary, the range of possible one-event impulses and gradually strengthening/declining forces 
that can exercise a negative/positive impact on the security of gas supply are too broad to be 
approached as “risks”, each one with its own magnitude and probability. As a consequence, most of the 
literature with a wider scope define disruptions in terms of “categories of crisis scenarios”, selected 
because they are reasonably likely to occur (often on the base of past experience).  
In some case, like in Poyry (2010a), probability distributions are applied to each of these scenario 
categories (see next box on probability calculation in the literature). In most of the other cases, a limited 
number of scenarios are selected on the basis of their expected impact, as in the two following cases: 
a) EWI (2009) selects 12 main scenarios: 6 infrastructure scenarios * 2 demand scenarios (EWI/ERGEG 
low demand case and ENTSOG high demand case), plus 6 sensitivities on Peak Day and 6 sensitivity on 
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 It is convenient to stress the difference between scenario analysis and the use of scenarios in a risk 
assessment. The main use of scenario analysis is to give a broad perspective of how the future could turn 
out, trying to cover a large part of its possible variety. Usually a best case, a worst case and an expected 
case, in addition to other possible cases, are generated. In general, no attempt to estimate probabilities / 
likelihoods is done. This makes the great difference with the use of scenarios in the framework of risk 
assessment, whose identification is driven by probability and consequences.   
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Disruptions (Ukraine Transit / Algeria supply disruption). The six infrastructure scenarios are: 
 Reference: Nord Stream I only (but no other major projects) 
 Nord Stream II: Reference + 2
nd
 line of Nord Stream 
 Nabucco: Reference + Nabucco pipeline 
 South Stream: Reference + South Stream pipeline (no midcat) 
 DG-TREN: Reference + 2
nd
 line of Nord Stream + Nabucco 
 LNG Glut: DG-TREN + lower LNG prices 
b) The ENTSOG Ten-Year network development plan 2011-2020 defines three categories of scenarios 
 Reference case scenarios, accommodating different levels of demand (average/high), supply 
(average/high) and infrastructural capacity (FID / FID + Non-FID), and used as a benchmark for 
comparison with the other two categories  
 Security of Supply scenarios, to assess the resilience of the network under a set of disruption 
scenarios or low storage deliverability, and under High Daily Demand condition for a one-day 
period (considering history, probability, season, frequency and duration of such occurrence as 
well as, where appropriate, geopolitical risks).  
 Market integration scenarios, to assess how far gas coming from each supply source can flow 
into the European gas network. 
. 
 
 
B) Probability/likelihood estimation_______________________________________ 
 
Probability/likelihood estimation may be either quantitative (numeric estimation of 
probabilities) or qualitative (soft likelihood estimation). The election of one or other choice 
depends on the availability of data, their quantity and quality. When almost no data are 
available, and their quality is either low or unknown, likelihoods may be estimated in a 
qualitative manner; otherwise quantitative assessments should be done. 
 
When the option selected is the qualitative one, a likelihood scale should be defined. The 
definition of classes in the scale should be as accurate as possible, which is not a simple task, 
given that qualitative scales are used under large uncertainty conditions. The number of classes 
should be neither too large (difficult to justify) nor too small (too little information). As an 
example, in the EURACOM project, the following five-class scale is suggested: 
 
 1 Very low probability (It is extremely unlikely that the incident will occur – no 
experience in the gas sector) 
 2 low probability (It is unlikely to occur – very limited experience in the gas 
sector) 
 3 Medium probability (It is a likely event – similar accidents have been reported 
in the gas sector) 
 4 High probability (It is very likely to occur – it has been experienced in most 
systems in the gas sector) 
 5 Certainty (It will happen in the close future) 
IEC/ISO 31010 quotes an application where also five classes are considered (likely, possible, 
unlikely, rare, remote). Some applications performed in the context of the Regulation consider 
between three classes (low, moderate, high) and five classes (the same as above)  
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In case the quantity and quality of data is enough, the following three generic strategies may be 
followed 
 Classical inference methods: these techniques are suggested when plenty of 
historical or experimental data are available. In this case usual techniques as for 
example the method of moments or the maximum likelihood method is of use. See 
annex 6 for more details. 
 Bayesian inference methods: these techniques are suggested when not many 
specific historical data are available, but some generic data may be of use. This 
could be the case for example if not much experience has been accumulated about 
a given facility, but similar facilities are available in other countries, which have 
accumulated long historical records. In those case, generic data from similar 
facilities/systems could be used to create a ‘prior distribution’, which could be 
combined with the likelihood obtained from the few historical specific records in 
order to generate the ‘posterior distribution’ for the quantity under estimation 
according to Bayes formula. See annex 6 for details. 
 Expert judgement (EJ): these techniques are suggested when not many data are 
available. In this case, well-known experts would be asked to participate in a 
structured EJ exercise to provide their estimates. Usually, even under severe scarcity 
of data, experts are able to quantify their opinions in terms of probabilities, which is 
much more useful than providing soft qualitative likelihood estimates in qualitative 
scales. See annex 7 for more details about structured EJ protocols and techniques. 
 
The three types of techniques mentioned may also be used to characterise any other parametric 
uncertainty that could arise in the Risk Analysis. This would be the case if a more complete 
definition of Risk is adopted (see annex 3) and system parameter uncertainties are accounted 
for explicitly. In such a case, parametric uncertainty should be characterised via estimation of 
the corresponding probability density functions by means of the adequate method among the 
three mentioned above. 
In addition to the three aforementioned techniques, event tree and fault tree analyses (see 
annex 9) are of help to estimate the probability of scenarios when there are no relevant data 
about the scenarios themselves, but data about the individual events used to build the scenario 
are available.     
In principle, the use of quantitative probability estimates is encouraged. The more quantitative 
the assessment is, the more useful their results become. Computations to calculate the 
probability of scenarios based on the occurrences of several events/processes or to calculate the 
probability of sets of scenarios are relatively simple. The same computations turn to be really 
ambiguous when the basic likelihoods have been estimated in a qualitative scale. 
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Probability calculation in the literature 
ARA (2009) is the only example in which probabilities of scenarios are explicitly estimated through a 
rigorous methodology, i.e. fault trees and event trees. This study assigns failure probabilities to each 
failure mode in a node. The more likely occurrences are used to build proper scenarios; a Bayesian 
approach is adopted for estimating probabilities of failure. 
Oxera (2007) builds assumptions on annual probability of operational outages, outages of transit routes, 
of terminals capacity, of capacity storage. A distribution of demand around the central scenario is also 
used, to derive annual and peak demand figures for 50 assumed gas years ranging from 1-in-50 warm to 
a 1-in-50 cold year. Poyry (2010a) also applies probabilistic distribution to the central supply and demand 
scenarios. 
Estonia RA, Latvia RA and Lithuanian RA provide a qualitative distinction of risks in high, intermediate, 
and low levels. 
 
 
C) Consequences assessment_____________________________________________ 
 
There are two main ways to assess consequences of scenarios: the use of expert judgement and 
the uses of models. Models are the best tools available to the organisations performing the Risk 
Assessment; they include all the available knowledge about the system and are preceded by a 
large effort of verification and validation prior to their widespread use with forecasting 
purposes. The use of expert judgement is not well justified when models and data to study the 
system are available. 
An issue to be solved by the implementers of the Regulation in each Member State is the 
selection of the measures of damage, as it was already mentioned in sections 2 and 3.1.2. In the 
next pages some advice is given about the modelling tools to be used depending of the 
measures of damage considered. We also discuss about the scales to use when summarising 
modelling results. 
 
Modelling as a tool for consequence assessment 
 
Models provide a crucial way of measuring the consequences of energy insecurity. This section 
presents a framework for the modelling of security of gas supply, i.e. for addressing it in a 
rigorous and as far as possible quantitative way.  
 
One’s choice of model depends on all the factors taken into account in the risk assessment thus 
far: the identification of the objectives of the assessment (i.e. the definition adopted for energy 
security and the acceptable level of risk by referring to the wider or narrower possible 
interpretation of the Regulation; the characterisation/parameters of the system (section 3.1); 
and the categorisation of threats/hazards (section 3.2.1) 
To select the methodology/model to be adopted for the analysis, a rigorous procedure could 
imply the following three steps: 
 
1. Identify the methodological requirements to assess the objectives in a quantitative way, 
i.e. the relevant issues for analyzing and modelling the gas market.  
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Different energy security threats and different insurance strategies have their own specific 
characteristics. To clarify the methodological requirements to address “properly” each of them, 
a framework normally used to classify energy-economy models has been adopted (see Annex 8). 
This approach helps to identify the elements of the system that must be considered in any 
specific assessment, and makes evident what are the characteristics of the “ideal” tool to be 
selected. 
 
2. Identify the models/tools fulfilling the minimal requirements to address the different 
objectives included in the Regulation.  
 
To do so, a table provided in the annex uses the categorization defined in the previous step 
(Table 8.1, Annex 8) to define the specifications that should be taken into account to “properly” 
address the targets of the regulation. Broadly, its purpose is to distinguish different 
methodological options for modelling the gas system, depending on the specifications of the 
Regulation. After all, the choice of model specifications/parameters depends on one’s 
interpretation of the Regulation. In other words, the model can take into account: 
• only the physical provision of natural gas 
• the requirement for solidarity and regional cooperation during supply disruptions 
• the economically-optimal level of gas security (e.g. by taking into account the costs 
and benefits of energy security projects as per the Regulation’s suggestion) 
• the environmental impact of security measures 
As discussed in section 2, these characteristics can be ordered in terms of increasing levels of 
methodological complexity (by virtue of taking into account more and more 
factors/requirements) and decreasing levels of relevance to the risk assessment. As such, the 
first two conditions are considered the minimum that must be taken into account by any 
model/tool used for assessing risks to natural gas security in the European Union.  
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 in the annex demonstrate how different approaches to the regulation can 
impact on the model/tool characteristics, by identifying the elements of the system that must 
be considered in any specific assessment: it shows how the simulation of the purely “physical” 
approach to security of gas supply (first target of the regulation) requires (among others 
characteristics): 
• an energy system and multi-energy market approach, in order to consider and 
simulate in a quantitative way the substitution possibilities throughout the whole 
energy system;  
• for the same reason, a detailed description of the technological characteristic of the 
system along the whole supply chain; 
• as part of this detailed technological description, a strong characterization of the 
network,  necessary to simulate the way gas flows inside the region under 
consideration; 
• a highly detailed approach in terms of time granularity if/when the focus is on the 
assessment of the impacts of a short-term shock; 
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Table 8.2 shows how, if taking into account solidarity and regional cooperation during a supply 
disruption is considered inescapable (indeed a requirement strongly stressed by the new 
regulation, as shown in section 2 of this report), then a supra-national / regional approach 
becomes a further necessary requirement. As a matter of fact, a geographical boundary of the 
system under study corresponding to the national level can be acceptable for a national RA 
assessing the possible impacts of a crisis on the national system. But it would fall short of 
addressing the need for solidarity and regional cooperation during a supply disruption. 
 
Last, the table shows the further requirements imposed to the methodology by the decision to 
address into the analysis the third main target of the regulation, i.e. the need to adopt an 
economic approach to gas security. This implies that any assessment should be able to: 
• simulate the functioning of market mechanisms; 
• take into account all the relevant information to identify the (regional/country 
specific) economically-optimal level of gas security, so as to strengthen security of 
gas supply at the lowest cost, and “without imposing unreasonable and 
disproportionate burdens on natural gas undertakings”. 
 
As implied in section 2, the last two objectives of the regulation have a more limited impact on 
the selection of the requirements of the methodology to be adopted. However, if the 
assessment aims to select energy security strategies with the lowest environmental impact, the 
selected methodology should be able to produce quantitative estimates of the environmental 
impact of a policy option. 
 
3. to survey and classify the existing quantitative tools/models used to analyze energy/gas 
security issues, to select the tool most suitable according to the objectives. 
 
The last step for the selection of the tool/model to be used for the assessment is to match the 
methodological requirements identified in the previous steps with the currently available 
tools/models.  
The survey of models provided in annex 8 does not aim to be comprehensive. Its aim is instead 
to show how the wide range of models available in the main literature can be differentiated on 
the basis of the theoretical framework proposed above. As the choice of the issues to be 
simulated are strictly country/region dependent, any Member State can either carry out its 
assessment by developing a model with the desired characteristics or consider the possibility to 
use one of the existing model. 
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Consequence assessment in the literature 
Several different modelling approaches can be adopted to assess the consequences of crisis scenarios:  
• Energy system models (REACCESS, Secure, UKERC) aim to represent all the interactions between 
all the components of the wide energy system. In order to obtain a proper representation of 
each of these components UKERC (2009) makes use of an energy system model as first step of a 
chain of three separate models with complementary characteristics, best suited  to address 
specific purposes: 1) MARKAL-MED UK, a linear optimisation model which covers the entire UK 
energy system and can address interactions between different parts of the energy system. 2) 
WASP electricity generation planning model, to explore in more detail the levels of generation 
investment needed to maintain reliable supplies. The WASP model is fed electricity demand 
assumptions from MARKAL-MED. 3) the geographically explicit Combined Gas and Electricity 
Networks (CGEN) model, to assess where electricity generation capacity should be located and 
how much gas and electricity infrastructure (wires, pipes, gas storage, import terminals) should 
be constructed. It is another cost-minimising model which is fed results from both MARKAL-MED 
and WASP. 
• Partial equilibrium economic models of the gas market are not able to represent these 
interactions, but are more detailed with respect to some characteristics of the gas market: 
TIGER is a good example of a detailed model for the assessment of the physical impact of supply 
crises, while Pegasus is able to assess the economic impact of a crisis. 
o TIGER, developed by EWI, is an economic based network (not "technical") simulation model, 
with a Geocoded Database: Coverage EU-27, 600 Nodes, 900 Pipeline sections (based on 
TSO Maps, Capacity / Pressure / Diameter, Nearly all Entry-Points, Major Exit Points, Border 
point capacities), 200 Storages (Type, Max. injection / withdrawal, Working Gas Volume), 
30 Terminals (Max. hourly / annual capacity, LNG Storage Capacity). Gas supply / demand / 
infrastructure projections are exogenous, based on data from European Commission / 
ERGEG / TSOs. The model minimize total cost of gas dispatch in the investigated year (2019) 
given infrastructure and supply, assuming an efficient EU downstream market and that all 
efficient and possible gas swaps are realised by TSOs. Technically available capacity is 
presumed to be made available to shippers efficiently according to market needs. TIGER 
identifies the physical need for network expansion, potential bottlenecks and the 
contribution of different infrastructures to SoS. 
o Pegasus (‘Pan-European GAS + US’) projects gas prices and flows and examines the 
interaction of supply and demand worldwide (17 European zones + US and Japan) on a daily 
basis, to estimate weekday/weekend differences, flows of the Interconnectors and gas flows 
in and out of storage in detail. Interconnection from GB to the Continent are modelled by 
minimising the cost of supplying gas to both zones, subject to both the capacity and the cost 
of transiting gas across the interconnectors. The major storage types are modelled 
accurately for each zone, each with its own injection and withdrawal rates, total storage 
capacity and cost of injection/withdrawal. The worldwide LNG market is modelled by 
considering all existing, under construction, proposed and conceptual LNG liquefaction 
projects worldwide, as well as LNG re-gasification terminals. Pegasus assumes perfect 
foresight, implying that alternative supplies are available when required. The combination 
of Pegasus with Prometheus, a stochastic model of the GB gas market, makes possible to 
estimate the economic impact of possible disruptions, by producing probability distribution 
of unserved energy and assessing their expected impact on the economy through a Gross 
Value Added analysis. For each disruption scenario Poyry (2010a) estimates not only their 
physical impact (through unserved energy, supply and demand, storage and LNG usage and 
DSR, capacity margins,…), but also the price impacts of a disruption and the GVA impact of 
unserved energy, the expected value of unserved energy, the price distribution for each day 
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of the year. 
 
 
Use of scales 
 
As in the case of probability/likelihood scales, risk analysis practitioners are encouraged to use 
quantitative scales as much as possible. This is certainly the scale to be used when models are 
used to forecast system performance. In this case, the use of either linear or logarithmic scales 
depends on the dispersion of results for the different scenarios, albeit in principle logarithmic 
scales may be of much help. The use of quantitative scales allows greater accuracy in the 
presentation of results and in the decision-making process inherent to the Risk Treatment phase 
(preventive action plan design). In the case of using expert judgement for estimating results, 
either quantitative or qualitative scales may be used. 
In case of using qualitative scales, a categorisation of results or definition of classes must be 
done. A balance must be found between the quality of the results provided and the accuracy. An 
intermediate number of classes is suggested (around five, see figure 2 in section 3.2.3.1). 
The following categorisation has been suggested: 
 Minor – when the impact of the risk leads to a disturbance in the supply which 
can be managed by market-based measures and supply to customers are not 
changed. 
 Noticeable – when the impact of the risk deteriorates supply conditions but the 
market is still able to resolve the situation with solely market based measures 
and consumers are not forced to restrict or significantly change their usual 
consumption 
 Severe – when the impact of the risk causes a serious supply disruption and 
emergency/non-market measures have to be introduced in order to provide 
supplies at least to protected customers. 
Literature in the area related to the Regulation use between 3 and 5 classes, see Poyry (2010), 
Lithuania’s Risk Assessment (2010), and ISO/IEC 31010, among other documents. 
 
Acknowledgement of uncertainty in consequence assessment 
 
In some cases, much uncertainty may be expected in the possible consequences of a scenario 
because of different reasons. In such situations, it could be of much interest a formal 
assessment of consequence uncertainty. Several methods are available in the literature, but 
certainly the most widespread general-purpose method to propagate uncertainties through a 
model is the Monte Carlo method, see annex 10. This method allows the estimation of the 
whole spectrum of possible consequences by means of estimating model input uncertainties, 
running the model under different values of input parameters and describing the consequences 
in statistical terms. 
  
Acknowledgement of uncertainty in the literature 
Poyry 2010a (section 4.3) performs a probabilistic analysis to estimate the diversity of possible incurred 
   
 40 
unserved energy quantities (its probability density function) among other output variables of interest. 
This was done by means of assigning probability distribution functions to short term losses in different 
sources of supply and to variations in demand due to weather and other factors, and propagating 
uncertainties via Monte Carlo simulation using the adequate models.  
 
3.2.2.2 Correlated risks and regional cooperation 
 
Each MS is not a standalone actor in the European gas system, but rather belongs to a network 
full of interactions and feedbacks. The events and processes that happen in one MS and the 
measures that it adopts to cope with the effects of events and processes may have an important 
impact on neighbouring countries. These potential effects have to be found and estimated. 
In principle there are two major sources of dependencies between different MS: 
• The occurrence of events and processes (scenarios) that affect more than one MS (in 
the standard RA jargon, these could be called common cause failures). For example,  
 Adverse severe weather conditions affecting several countries 
 High prices in the spot market affecting simultaneously all countries 
 Failure of key infrastructures of common use (electricity grid blackout) 
 
• The reliance on neighbouring countries for obtaining gas, e.g. problems in the physical 
flow of gas in a country propagating to downstream countries, or shared reliance on 
cross-border storage capabilities 
Once national risk has been assessed, it should be possible to identify the interaction and 
correlation of risks with other Member States (Article 9d), particularly if the risk assessment 
methodologies are commensurable. This is possible by an analysis of the following: 
• interconnections, including maximal interconnection capacity of each border entry and 
exit point 
• cross-border supplies 
• cross-border access to storage facilities  
• bi-directional capacity 
 
A joint risk assessment can be undertaken according to Annex 4 of the Regulation.  Assessing the 
interaction and correlation of risks with other Member States is an important part of this step. 
The N-1 formula can form the basis of a regional risk assessment. For the calculation of the N-1 
formula at regional level, the single largest gas infrastructure of common interest shall be used. 
The single largest gas infrastructure of common interest to a region is the largest gas 
infrastructure in the region that directly or indirectly contributes to the supply of gas to the 
Member States of that region and shall be defined in the joint Preventive Action Plan. The 
regional N-1 calculation can only replace the national N-1 calculation, where the single largest 
gas infrastructure of common interest is of major importance for the gas supply of all Member 
States concerned according to the joint risk assessment.
39
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3.2.2.3 Timeframes 
 
The system analysed evolves over time due to many different factors such as the depletion of 
sources of gas, the discovery of new sources, the development of new infrastructures, the 
degradation of old infrastructures not sufficiently maintained, and so on. This evolution may 
have a significant impact on the probabilities of scenarios and on their potential consequences. 
Therefore, it is of interest to extend the Risk Assessment to different timeframes, particularly if 
important changes are expected in the system. An a priori categorisation of timeframes that 
may be considered is the following one:  
 
 short-term: existing risks and risks appearing within the coming 5 years 
 medium-term: risks appearing within the coming 5-10 years 
 long-term: risks appearing in more than 10 years 
 
3.2.3 Risk evaluation 
 
According to ISO 31000 (2009), 
 
“The aim of this step is to assist in making decisions, based on the outcomes of risk analysis, 
about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment implementation.” 
 
Risk Evaluation is the phase where the Risk Analysis results are collected and put together. The 
target is to show the results in the most understandable possible way to facilitate the 
interpretation of results and the decision-making process to be done in the Risk Treatment 
phase (preventive action plan) and to be used for collecting risks on the regional level in case of 
the establishment of a joint Risk Assessment.  
In principle, any clear presentation of results is enough, as for example the list of scenarios 
ranked according to either their likelihoods or to the assessed consequences, accompanied by 
any explanatory text (commonly called ‘risk summaries’).  
Nevertheless, the probably optimal ways to represent results, depending on if the assessment 
has been either qualitative or quantitative, are respectively: 
• The Risk Matrix 
• The Complementary cumulative curve of the output (random) variable ‘damage’ 
 
3.2.3.1 The Risk Matrix 
 
The Risk Matrix is the adequate way to represent results from a qualitative assessment. On the 
x-axis classes of consequences are represented (increasing damage from left to right). On the y-
axis classes of likelihood are represented (increasing likelihood from below to above). The 
Cartesian product of both axes provides all the possible combinations of likelihoods and 
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consequences. A colour code (green – yellow -red) and/or number code (I–II-III-IV, etc.) 
indicates the severity of the combination likelihood-consequences.  Each scenario is represented 
in the matrix using some code (numbers, letters, acronyms, etc.) 
This type of representation allows a fast visual identification of most severe scenarios.  
Nevertheless, as it was already mentioned in the section 3.2.2.1, it is not easy to find what could 
be the global risk associated to a set of scenarios. For example, in fig 2, if we get as results of the 
Risk Analysis that four scenarios fall in the cell (severe, possible), it is not easy to deduce if the 
global risk associated to this set of four scenarios would fall in the same cell or if it should be 
moved upwards in the likelihood scale, getting into the ‘High’ Risk region.  
 
Fig 2.- Example of Risk Matrix; ISO/IEC 2009 
 
 
 
3.2.3.2 The complementary cumulative curve of the output (random) variable 
‘damage’ 
 
The complementary cumulative curve of the output variable ‘damage’ is the adequate way to 
represent results from a quantitative assessment. On the x-axis consequences are represented 
(increasing damage from left to right). On the y-axis probabilities are represented (increasing 
probability from below to above). In fact, on the y-axis exceedance probabilities are represented 
(the probability that the damage exceeds any given value). 
In order to create this representation, scenarios are ranked according to the consequences. 
Then, for each possible value of the consequences, the probability of exceeding that value is 
represented on the y-axis. As a result a stepwise function is obtained, like the one represented 
in figure 3. 
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Fig 3.- Example of complementary cumulative curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The complementary cumulative curve of the damage contains all the information about the 
output variable considered. Once the risk criteria are defined, it may be used to check if the 
system fulfils them or not. Figure 3 represents a fictitious case analysis with seven scenarios. The 
black straight line represents the risk criterion (it divides the damage – probability space in two 
regions: the region of acceptable risk and the region of unacceptable risk). 
 
Risk Evaluation in the literature 
All three Baltic State Risk Assessments provide risk matrices (3x3 or 4x4) that establish consequences 
and likelihoods on a qualitative scale. The ARA report, in addition to providing a 5x3 risk matrix, also 
evaluates risk on the basis of histograms and risk summaries.  
Poyry (2010a,b), Oxera (2007), CBP (2006) do not use for their final evaluation a risk matrix, as the 
criteria they adopted are not strictly speaking “risk criteria” (see box on Risk criteria in the literature), so 
they derive their conclusions on the basis of their cost-benefit analyses. 
 
4. Summary 
 
The purpose of this report has been to provide guidance for undertaking a risk 
assessment as per Article 9 of the Regulation 994/2010. It has presented a brief 
overview of the main tools and essential features used for performing risk assessments, 
and has related these tools to the requirements and specificities of the gas system. In 
doing so, the report has combined general risk management methods with a sector-
specific approach. The main steps of the risk assessment have followed best practices, 
not only through employing ISO standards but also by drawing on substantive risk 
assessments carried out by industry, academia and policy-makers.    
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This report enables member states a certain of degree of freedom in choosing the 
optimal methods for assessing risks to their respective gas supplies.  
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 ANNEX 1 
 
ISO 31000 
 
 
The ISO 31000 International Standard provides principles and generic guidelines on risk 
management. This International Standard can be used by any public, private or community 
enterprise, association, group or individual. Therefore, this International Standard is not specific 
to any industry or sector. This International Standard can be applied throughout the life of an 
organization, and to a wide range of activities, including strategies and decisions, operations, 
processes, functions, projects, products, services and assets. The standard can be applied to any 
type of risk, whatever its nature, whether having positive or negative consequences.  
 
According to ISO the risk management process should be an integral part of management, 
embedded in the culture and practices of the organization and tailored to the business 
processes of the organization. It comprises the following activities: 
 
1. Communication and consultation 
Communication and consultation with external and internal stakeholders should take place 
during all stages of the risk management process. Effective external and internal communication 
and consultation should take place to ensure that those accountable for implementing the risk 
management process and stakeholders understand the basis on which decisions are made. 
 
2. Establishing the context 
By establishing the context the organization articulates its objectives, defines the external and 
internal parameters to be taken into account when managing risk and sets the scope and risk 
criteria for the remaining process.  
 
3. Risk assessment 
Risk assessment is the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. (ISO 
/IEC 31010 provides guidance on risk assessment techniques) 
 
4. Risk treatment 
Risk treatment involves selecting one or more options for modifying risk, and implementing 
those options. Risk treatment options are not necessarily mutually exclusive or appropriate in all 
circumstances. The options can include e.g.: avoiding the risk, removing the risk source, 
changing likelihood, changing consequences, sharing the risk with another party or parties. 
 
5. Monitoring and review 
Both monitoring and review should be a planned part of the risk management process and 
involve regular checking or surveillance. The organization's monitoring and review process 
should encompass all aspects of the risk management process for the purpose of ensuring that 
controls are effective and efficient; obtaining further information to improve risk assessment; 
analyzing and learning lessons from events; detecting changes in the external and internal 
context, including changes to risk criteria and the risk itself; identifying emerging risks.   
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The risk management process is presented in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk management process 
 
 
 
Reference 
 
ISO 31000:2009, Risk management – Principles and guidelines 
ISO/IEC 31010, Risk management – Risk assessment techniques 
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ANNEX 2 
 
Energy Security Indicators 
 
 
1. Macro-economical indicators 
a) Energy intensity: The energy intensity of GDP is the ratio of primary energy consumption 
expressed in tons of oil equivalent (toe) to GDP (expressed in euro).  
b) Gas consumption per capita 
c) Net gas imports bill: Vulnerability is not only linked to dependency on imports expressed in 
quantities, but also to the value of these imports. The net gas import bill takes into account the 
net imports and the average annual gas prices.  
d) Average gas prices: This indicator compares the gas prices and volatility of prices among MS. 
 
2. Energy balance indicators 
These indicators are used to compute the energy balance of the total national market, including 
imports, exports, the transformation sector, the energy industry use, distribution losses and 
conversion losses, non-energy use and final consumption indicators. 
 
3. Reserves indicators 
The reserves-to-production ratios (R/P ratios) indicate the years of production left at current 
production levels. It has to be noted that neither reserves nor production are fixed. 
Consequently, a combination of these factors will also be a dynamic quantity.  
An alternative indicator is a reserves-to-consumption ratio, which expresses the proven reserves 
of a country in terms of years of actual gas consumption. 
 
4. Sectoral indicators 
The fourth group of indicators quantifies the relative gas consumption of the various sectors. 
Given the sectoral differences between MS, a gas disruption will have different impacts on their 
economies. An example would be the share of gas-fired power generation in total industrial 
electricity consumption.  
These figures imply different needs for seasonal flexibility, different peaks of gas demand, 
different possibilities for interruptible contracts and fuel substitution and fundamentally, 
different level of importance attached to security of gas supply.  
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5. Diversification indicators 
Diversification is regularly regarded as the main solution to energy insecurity. However, 
diversification is a very broad and general concept. We try to assess diversification based on six 
simple sub-indicators for diversification. 
 
a) Diversification of primary energy mix: The first of six sub-indicators is the diversification 
indicator of the primary energy mix (PEM). The gas shares of the PEM of all MS are compared 
over the years.  
 
b) Diversification of electricity production: A second diversity aspect is the diversification of the 
electricity production. In the context of the Regulation, gas shares used for power generation 
between countries can be compared. These indicators are interesting to analyze spill-over 
effects on the electricity sector in the event of a gas disruption.  
c) Diversification of gas suppliers: A third important element in this respect is the diversification 
of the supplier portfolio of each Member State.  
d) Diversification supply routes: Another important consideration is the number of entry points 
for imported fuels.  
e) LNG diversification: Another way to look at diversification is LNG diversification. If a country 
has access to both natural gas by pipeline and gas in the form of LNG by transport over sea, it 
can be considered as more diversified. The evolution of pipeline and LNG shares can be an 
useful indication of how countries are diversified with regard to LNG.  
 
6. Import risk indicators 
The import risk indicators are trying to quantify a certain risk involved with natural gas and LNG 
imports for every MS, using supplier country risks and transit country risks. We are currently 
using OECD-country risks, but want to construct our own country risks for the main transit and 
supplier countries. Market concentration and import (inter)dependency are discussed. 
 
a) Market concentration: A useful index for determining import risk can be borrowed from 
economics: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which provides a measure of market 
concentration. In the energy sector, this index has been used to determine a country’s level of 
supply diversification (by calculating the sum of the squared market shares of each supplier for 
a given country). 
 
where si is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms. This can also 
be extended to consider risk associated to the gas exporting country (for example by referring 
to OECD country risk ratings). Here, the indicator for market concentration for gas import 
would be expressed as such: 
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where  
N is the number of gas exporting countries (suppliers)  
jr  is the risk associated to the gas exporting country (supplier)  j  
ijsh  is the share, in the total import of gas, of gas coming from supplier j 
(if all the risks are equal, the smaller the value of c, the more concentrated is the market, i.e. the 
less suppliers). The final value of the market concentration index for gas import is 
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The larger the value, the less the import risk.  
 
 A similar measure found in biology, the Shannon–Wiener index, has also been used to 
determine diversity not only in imports but also in relation to the level of fuel mix 
diversification, using the formula: 
1 log( )
logShannon n nn
I p p
N
−
= ∑
  
where N is the total number of energy sources in the PEM and n
p
is the share for each source. 
The maximum value of the index is 1 and is reached when all the shares are equals to 1/ N ; the 
minimum value is 0 and is reached when one of the shares is equal to 1 and the rest to 0. The 
larger the index, the more diversified the country and we assume that it is more “secure”. 
 
b) Import dependency: Import dependency can be expressed as import over total gas 
consumption: 
 
_
_
i
i
i
Gas importID
GIC gas
= , for every 1,..., MSi n=  (GIC stands for Gross Inland Consumption). This 
quantity is negative for exporting countries. 
 
Next to the computation of traditional import dependency indicators (based on annual data), it 
can also be useful to compute simple indicators for seasonal import dependency. Seasonal 
fluctuations in gas demand in all countries are exceptionally high. Since domestic production (if 
any) has a rather flat (constant) profile throughout the year, import dependence during periods 
of high demand becomes much more significant. 
 
7. Infrastructure indicators 
a) Storage infrastructure 
Storage infrastructure is mainly needed to meet seasonal fluctuations of gas demand.  
   
 55 
 
_ _
_ _
i
i
i
Gas storage capacityIS
Final gas consumption
=  
This indicator has a dimension, because the 2 quantities, gas storage capacity and final gas 
consumption have different units. An indicator also needs to account for seasonal variation in 
storage and be wary of temporal/unit measurements (peak, average, daily, etc) as well as the 
type of storage (principally base/peak load).  
 
b) Interconnection infrastructure 
Interconnection indicators need to take into account the number of entry/exit points and the 
maximal technical capacity of each (in relation to actual flows). What also matters is the length 
and reserved capacity of the supplying pipeline before it enters the national gas market.  
c) LNG Infrastructure 
Some European countries have the ability to acquire additional LNG shipments through their 
existing LNG-terminals. An indicator could take into account the total maximal import capacity 
of LNG facilities in relation to current usage (as well as any cross-border commitments to 
withdraw/offer LNG) 
 
d) Infrastructure Standard
40
 (994/2010) 
 
Definition of the N-1 formula: The N-1 formula describes the ability of the technical capacity of 
the gas infrastructure to satisfy total gas demand in the calculated area in the event of 
disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure during a day of exceptionally high gas demand 
occurring with a statistical probability of once in 20 years. Gas infrastructure includes the gas 
transmission network including interconnectors as well as production, LNG and storage facilities 
connected to the calculated area. The technical capacity of all remaining available gas 
infrastructure in the event of disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure should be at least 
equal to the sum of the total daily gas demand of the calculated area during a day of 
exceptionally high gas demand occurring with a statistical probability of once in 20 years. The 
results of the N-1 formula, as calculated below, should at least equal 100 %. 
 
a. Calculation method of the N-1 formula: 
 
 
…………… …EPm + Pm  + S m +  LNG m – I m  
       N-1[%] = --------------------------------------------------   x 100, N-1 ≥100% 
 
………………………………… Dmax 
 
 
b. Calculation method of the N-1 formula using demand-side measures: 
 
The N-1 shall also be considered fulfilled where it is demonstrated in the Preventive Action Plan 
that a supply disruption may be sufficiently compensated for, in a timely manner, by 
                                                        
40
 Annex 1 regulation 
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appropriate market-based demand-side measures. For that purpose, the formula provided in 
point 4 of Annex 1 of the Regulation shall be used. 
 
 
…………… …EPm + Pm  + S m +  LNG m – I m  
       N-1[%] = --------------------------------------------------   x 100, N-1 ≥100% 
 
………………………………… Dmax – Deff 
 
 
"Deff" means the part (in mcm/d) of Dmax that in case of a supply disruption can be sufficiently 
and timely covered with market-based demand-side measures in accordance with Article 5(1)(b) 
and Article 6 (2) of the regulation. 
 
 
e) Supply standard
41
 (994/2010) 
 
The Supply Standard stipulates that gas supply needs to be ensured for protected customers in 
the three following cases: 
 
a) extreme temperatures during a seven-day peak period,  
b) any period of at least 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, and 
c) for a period of at least 30 days in the case of the n-1 scenario during average winter 
conditions. 
 
Formally these three cases are scenarios. The Regulation does not require to estimate their 
respective probabilities. 
 
                                                        
41
 Article 8, EC Regulation 994/2010 
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ANNEX 3 
 
A formal extended definition of Risk 
 
The definition of Risk given in section 3.2 of the main text in this document is a simplification of 
the full definition needed to address such a concept including all uncertainties that may arise in 
a system. The basic idea remains the same: Risk is adequately addressed by answering formally 
to the following questions: 
• What can happen and why? 
• What are the consequences? 
• What is the probability of its future occurrence? 
 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) showed that a formal answer to these three questions requires 
describing risk through the use of a set of triplets 
})(),(,{ ><= iiiii yfpsR φ     .,...,2,1 Ni = ,   (1) 
where  
4. i
s
 represents scenario i in the set of n scenarios considered. 
5. 
)( iip φ is the probability density function (pdf) that characterises our state of 
uncertainty about scenario i. 
6. 
)( ii yf is the pdf that characterises our uncertainty about the potential 
consequences induced by our uncertainty about the system parameters under the 
conditions of scenario i. 
This constitutes a formal mathematical definition of risk. Using this scheme to address the 
concept of risk means a full acknowledgement of all the uncertainties affecting the system 
under study.  
It means that all possible scenarios must be identified and the uncertainty about their potential 
occurrence must be assessed (realise the difference with the text in the main document, iϕ is 
replaced by 
)( iip φ ); not only the probability of each one must be estimated, but the pdf that 
characterises the uncertainty about the whole set of probabilities: the multivariate pdf that 
characterises the uncertainty about the complete set of scenarios, subject to the restriction that 
the addition of all probabilities is one (although in principle the dimension of the probability 
space considered is N – the number of scenarios considered – the actual dimension of the space 
is N-1).  
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Moreover, for each scenario, the uncertainties associated to each potential consequence, in 
terms of pdf, must also be estimated (realise the difference with the text in the main document, 
iy is replaced by
)( ii yf ). In many scenarios the boundary conditions and the values of many 
system parameters are not well known. An adequate estimation of consequences demands a 
proper estimation of input uncertainties and the propagation of uncertainties through the 
system model (most likely via Monte Carlo). 
Intermediate possibilities between the approach adopted in the main text and the approach 
shown until now in this annex are possible. The most frequent one consist in ignoring the 
uncertainty in the assessment of probabilities of occurrence of different scenarios but 
acknowledging the uncertainty in possible outcomes of a given scenario. 
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ANNEX 4 
 
Techniques for Risk identification 
Several risk identification techniques exist in the literature. IEC/ISO 31010 provides a detailed 
overview and a comparison of these techniques. Some of the most widely ised risk identification 
techniques are: 
f) brainstorming 
g) structured or semi structured interviews 
h) check lists 
i) Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) 
j) Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 
 
This Annex provides a short description of each technique, highlighting main characteristics, 
when they are most useful, types of inputs needed and outputs obtainable, most remarkable 
strengths and limitations. 
 
a) Brainstorming 
Brainstorming involves stimulating and encouraging free flow conversation amongst group of 
knowledgeable people to identify potential failures modes and associate hazards, risks, criteria 
for decisions.  
 
Use: Brainstorming places heavy emphasis on imagination and is therefore particularly useful 
when identifying risks of new technology, where there is no data or where novel solutions to 
problems are needed.  
 
Input: Team of people with knowledge of the system under analysis. 
 
Output: Might be a list of risks and current controls 
 
Strengths: encourages imagination (novel situation and new risks); involves key stakeholders; 
relatively quick and easy 
 
Limitations: it is relatively unstructured, it may not have been comprehensive; participants may 
lack the appropriate knowledge; group dynamics.  
 
b) Structured and semi structured interview 
Individuals are asked a set of predefined questions which encourage the interviewee to view 
situations from different perspective. Se  
 
Use: They can be useful where it is difficult to get people together for a brainstorming session.  
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Input: A clear definition of the objectives of the interviews, a list of interviewees, a prepared set 
of questions. 
 
Output: Stakeholders views on the issues which are the subject of the interviews.  
 
Strengths: allow people time for considered thought about an issue; more in depth 
consideration of an issue in a one to one communication; enable the involvement of a large 
number of stakeholders than brainstorming.  
 
Limitations: time consuming; the triggering of imagination may not be achieved.  
 
c) Check lists 
They are list of hazards, risks or control failures that have been developed usually from 
experience (as results of previous risk assessment or past failures) 
 
Use: They may be used as part of other risk assessment techniques, but are most useful when 
applied to check that everything has been covered after a more imaginative technique.  
 
Inputs: Prior information and expertise on the issue. 
 
Outputs: They may be a list of controls which are inadequate or a list of risks. 
 
Strengths: may be used by non experts; combine wide ranging expertise into an easy to use 
system; help ensuring that common problems are not forgotten.  
 
Limitations: address the known known's; encourage tick the box type of behaviour; tend to be 
observation based, so miss problems that are not readily seen.  
 
d) Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
The HAZOP study method is the most widely known technique for hazard identification. It was 
developed by ICI in the 1960s and its use and development was encouraged by the Chemical 
Industries Association guide published in 1977. 
The concept of Hazard study first appeared with the aim of identifying possible hazards 
present in facilities that manage highly hazardous materials. The purpose was to eliminate any 
source leading to major accidents, namely toxic releases, explosions and fires (Seveso Directive). 
However, over the years, Hazop's application extended to other types of facilities because of its 
success in identifying not only hazards, but also operational or organizational problems.  Hazop 
has been adopted for medical diagnosis systems, road-safety measures, identification of 
managerial and organizational failures, black out analysis, among the others. This diversity of 
usages illustrates how Hazop has become considered as a powerful technique to improve many 
kinds of systems. 
It is a highly disciplined procedure meant to identify how a process may deviate from its 
design intent. It is defined as the application of a formal, systemic critical examination of the 
process and the engineering intention of new or existing facilities to assess the potential for 
malfunctioning of individuals pieces of equipment. It is a technique that "provides the 
opportunities for people to let their imagination go free and think of all possible ways in which 
hazards or operating problems might arise, but – to reduce the chance that something is 
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missed- it is done in a systematic way. The study is carried out by a team so that the members 
can stimulate each other and build upon each other's ideas" (HAZOP and HAZAN, Identifying and 
assessing process industry hazards, Trevor Kletz, 1992).  
The HAZOP process is a qualitative technique based on the use of guide-words which question 
how the design intention or operating conditions may not be achieved at each step of the 
design, process, procedure or system. It is carried out by multidisciplinary team.  
Inputs: essential inputs are current information about the system, process or procedure to be 
reviewed. Inputs may include: drawings, specification sheets, flow sheets, process control and 
logic diagrams, layout drawings, operating and maintenance procedures, and emergency 
response procedures.  
 
Steps in HAZOP study: 
• nomination of a HAZOP leader  
• definition of the objectives and scope of the study 
• establishing a set of key or guidewords for the study, 
• defining a HAZOP team; usually the team is a multidisciplinary team and should include design 
and operation personnel with appropriate technical expertise to evaluate the effects of 
deviations. 
• collection of the required documentation 
• splitting the system, process or procedure in smaller elements or sub systems 
• for each items in the sub-system apply the guidewords one after the other to postulate 
possible deviations which will have undesirable consequences 
• where undesirable outcomes are identified, agreeing the cause and consequences in each 
case and suggesting how they might be treated to prevent them occurring 
• documenting the discussion 
 
Outputs: minutes of the HAZOP meeting with items for each review point recorded. This should 
include: the guide word used, the deviation, possible causes, actions to address the identified 
problems and person responsible for the action.   
 
Strengths: systematic and thorough examination of a system, process or procedure; it involves a 
multidisciplinary team; it is applicable to a wide range of systems, processes and procedures; it 
creates a written record of the process of risk identification 
 
Limitations: a detailed analysis can be time consuming and expensive; a detailed analysis 
requires a high level of documentation; it can focus the discussion on detail issues of design and 
not on wider external issues 
 
d) Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 
Failure modes and effects analysis is a technique used to identify the ways in which 
components, systems or processes can fail to fulfil their design intent. 
 
FMEA identifies: 
• all the potential failure modes of the various parts of a system  
• the effects these failures may have on a system 
• the mechanisms of failure 
• how to avoid the failure 
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Use: there are several applications of FMEA: design, system, process, service. 
 
Inputs: FMEA needs information about the elements of the system in sufficient detail for 
meaningful analysis of the ways in which each element can fail.  
 
Outputs: The primary output of FMEA is a list of failure modes, the failure mechanisms and 
effects for each component or step of a system or process.  
 
Strengths: widely applicable to human, equipment and system failure modes; identify 
components failure modes, their causes and their effects on the system; identify single points 
failure modes and requirement for redundancy or safety systems. 
 
Limitations:  it can only be used to identify single failure modes; it can be time consuming and 
costly; it can be difficult and tedious for multi-layered systems. 
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ANNEX 5 
 
Review of FP-7 research projects 
 
 
In this Annex we present an overview of existing FP7 projects which are related to risk 
assessments, vulnerability and security in the energy world. The following FP7 projects are 
discussed: EURACOM, INTEGRISK, SECURE, REACCESS, COUNTERACT 
 
EURACOM: European Risk Assessment and Contingency planning Methodologies for 
interconnected energy networks 
 
EURACOM- European Risk Assessment and Contingency planning Methodologies, is an EC-FP7 
financed Coordination Action.  EURACOM addresses the issue of protection and resilience of 
energy supply for European Interconnected energy networks. The main goal of EURACOM is to 
identify, together with European Critical Energy Infrastructure operators, a common and holistic 
approach for risk assessment and contingency planning methods. This objective to increase 
resilience with respect to network dependencies in energy infrastructures is facilitated by 
developing common methodologies and tools that assure a dialogue, sharing of data and close 
co-operation between energy operators, large energy users, security solution suppliers, 
administrations, regulatory bodies, and other stakeholders. This approach requires common 
methodologies all along the value chain, from production to distribution. It also requires 
common methodologies at different hierarchical levels, from individual companies up to 
European level. By establishing coherent risk management procedures across energy sectors 
and EU countries, the resilience of critical energy services across the whole (‘end-to-end’) 
energy infrastructure chain is sought to be increased. This is why the EURACOM method is 
applicable to various energy sectors and at various levels within those sectors. 
 
EURACOM covers all applicable hazards to the energy sector, including threats from natural 
causes, human intent, technical failure, human failure, dependencies of other Critical 
Infrastructures and other dependencies. Furthermore the method includes both risk assessment 
and contingency planning.  
 
The EURACOM methodology relies on an integrated and holistic approach to risk management 
and contingency planning. It aims to support energy infrastructure operators to adapt to a 
changing landscape and new challenges as given by the adoption of the European Energy 
Directive. It enables operators to improve their risk management practices and to implement 
their own holistic risk management system building on and integrating with existing practices 
and systems (e.g. asset management). For the above mentioned reasons, the method has been 
conceived to be simple, flexible and modular. Moreover it provides guidance on the basis of 
essential steps and elements and on the tailoring for the application of the method in specific 
energy sub sectors (electricity, oil, gas).  
 
Objective: to identify a common and holistic approach (end-to-end energy supply chain) for risk 
assessment and contingency planning. 
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Domain: Energy: gas, oil, electricity  
 
Main concepts used: Risk Assessment is the initial process used to assess the potential impact 
and the likelihood of threats exploiting vulnerabilities in order to provide a risk rating prior to 
the implementation of any risk treatment or mitigation  
 
Scope and Variables: 
• Scope of the report is to concentrate on energy operators – e.g. not the policy-makers or 
regulators/associations but the actors in the supply chain: producers, TSO/DSO, suppliers, 
consumers, etc.  
• In the case study of gas, EURACOM narrow the scope to transmission, which is justified “by 
the fact that energy grids are the pivotal point of dependencies and cascading effects at 
European scale whether we talk about dependencies between grids themselves or their 
interaction with source and distribution.”  
• Variables: Primary Gas Transmission Infrastructure: Pipes, storage tanks, and compressors; 
Supporting Gas Transmission Infrastructure: gas receipt station, odourisation, blending 
station, SCADA/Telemetry, ICT, facilities, engineering functions, maintenance functions, and 
tools for contingency plans; Dependencies: Tankers, Terminals, Interconnectors, PIG 
launchers (see pg. 55) 
 
Methodology and Framework 
The seven steps of the EURACOM risk assessment process are summarized below (high level 
perspective): 
 
1. Set up of an holistic team with an holistic view 
2. Define the holistic scope of the risk assessment  
3. Define the risk assessment scale (probability and impact) 
4. Understand the assets in the scope 
5. Understand the threats context 
6. Review security and identify vulnerabilities 
7. Evaluate and rank the risks 
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Figure 1: the EURACOM risk assessment approach 
 
This is called holistic risk management, which considers 4 dimensions – physical security / 
information and communication technology security / organisational security / human factors 
regarding security. These 4 dimensions are used to analyse each of the components of the risk – 
e.g. assets, vulnerabilities, threats and effects.  
 
Outcome: Only the step-by-step process of risk identification and assessment is covered. The 
example of assessing risks in gas transmission provides only a very general summary of possible 
risk factors. There is no concrete empirical case study, and therefore no discussion of results of 
the risk assessment.   
 
Evaluation: The narrowed scope means that risks emanating from a different part of the supply 
chain are unaccounted for, even though they may affect the transmission grid (for example, the 
risks involved in cross-border energy dependence are not mentioned) 
-there are no concrete outlines for identifying specific risks and vulnerabilities in the gas 
transmission system. 
-too general to be of much use – e.g. concretely applying the step-by-step process encounters 
the risk of omitting several important variables.  
-moreover, there are several variables not taken into account, perhaps because they are outside 
of the scope but nevertheless impact on the risks to transmission (e.g. capacity of gas storage – 
if you’ve got enough gas stored then the consequences of a destroyed interconnector are less 
severe – but maybe that’s accounted for in contingency planning?) 
 
SECURE: Security of energy considering its uncertainty, risk and economic implications 
 
The SECURE project builds a comprehensive framework that considers all the issues related to 
the topic of security of supply, including geopolitics, price formation and the economic and 
technical design of energy markets inside and outside the EU. Tools, methods and models are 
developed to measure and assess EU security of energy supply both outside the EU and inside 
the EU. 
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The objective is to evaluate the vulnerability of the EU to the different risks which affect energy 
supplies in order to help optimizing the Union's energy insecurity mitigation strategies, including 
infrastructure investment, demand side management and dialogue with producing countries. 
This project will develop energy security indicators for all the major energy sources in order to 
identify the risk factors and quantify the EU exposure to volume and price risks in the short and 
long terms, including impacts of severe accidents and terrorist threats. 
Costs and benefits (both measurable and perceived) of energy security will be evaluated for 
different energy supply/demand scenarios to help policy makers providing the most appropriate 
institutional, political and industrial solutions. All major energy sources and technologies (oil, 
natural gas, coal, nuclear, renewables and electricity) will be addressed from upstream to 
downstream with both a global and sectoral analysis studying in depth issues such as technical, 
economic/regulatory and geopolitical risks. 
The analysis will also integrate demand as a key issue related to energy security. The SECURE 
project has both a strong quantitative and qualitative component and will at the end not only 
provide a comprehensive methodological and quantitative framework to measure energy 
security of supply, but it will also propose policy recommendations on how to improve energy 
security taking into account costs, benefits and risks of various policy choices. 
 
A. Risk analysis-based measures of energy security 
 
Type: Deliverable No 1.2 for the FP7 Project (Security of Energy Considering its Uncertainty, Risk 
and Economic Implications - SECURE) 
 
Objective: providing an overview of the different methods used to assess energy security risks 
from different viewpoints.  
 
Domain: energy / all  
 
Main concepts used: In the context of security, ‘risk’ is defined as a function of three variables: 
‘threat’ is the measure that a specific accidental or intentional event will take place. 
‘Vulnerability’ is the measure of likelihood that various types of safeguards fail. ‘Consequence’ is 
the magnitude of negative effects in case of an accident or successful attack. Risk is a kind of 
quantifiable ‘incertitude’ (in contrast to the unquantifiable incertitudes of uncertainty and 
ignorance).  
 
Scope and Variables: There are three types of risks (according to Stern 2002) in the gas sector: 
investment and facility risks, exporters’ reliability risks and transit risks. The Secure project adds 
liberalisation as a potential source of risk, and points to contingency tools such as storage and 
supply flexibility.  
 
Methodology and Framework: the study is interested in comparative risk assessment, an 
expected utility approach, a Bayesian and scenario-based approach, and particularly multi-
criteria analysis.  
 
Outcome: Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) combines a set of technology specific indicator values 
and stakeholder preferences within an interactive framework.  
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Evaluation: The discussion of risk evaluation methodologies is not integrated with the discussion 
that is specific to energy security. Therefore this deliverable only provides a generic overview of 
risk assessment methodologies.  
 
B. Natural Gas Dependency and Analysis of Economic, Physical, and Social Impact of Natural Gas 
Supply Disruption 
 
Type: Deliverable No 5.2.1 for the FP7 Project (Security of Energy Considering its Uncertainty, 
Risk and Economic Implications - SECURE) 
 
Objective: examine the gas demand of the EU and categorize events that may give rise to 
physical natural gas supply shocks 
 
Domain: gas / EU 
 
Main concepts used: vulnerability is the exposure to a disruption and the extent to which the 
energy sector will experience adverse effect (harm or damage) from that disruption. 
Vulnerability of a country to energy supply disruptions is time dependent and multidimensional. 
Therefore, although it is a function of risk and resilience (robustness or the speed of recovery) it 
depends on a complex set of inherent states and hence can be represented through multiple 
metrics such as (strength and capability, i.e., ability and capacity) of a country to anticipate, 
cope with, resist and recover from the impact of such a disruption. In this sense, the degree of 
vulnerability is a combination of different factors; among which is energy intensity, flexibility in 
modifying the energy mix, quick response and adaptation to energy price increases and the 
ability to manage disruption of the energy supply. Threat is the intent and capability to cause 
adverse effects. Risk is a measure of the probability of a supply disruption occurring, and 
severity of adverse effects that could result. Risk can be interpreted as result of a threat. Both 
threat and risk require knowledge about vulnerability.  
 
Scope and Variables: Six main categories of potential risks to natural gas security – technical, 
geopolitical, regulatory, economic/commercial, environmental and transit risks. Risk assessment 
and risk management can be pursued only after full knowledge on vulnerability is accumulated. 
In risk assessment, the analyst often attempts to answer the following set of questions: What 
can go wrong? What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? What is exposed to harm or 
damage? What is the frequency of endangerment? How often it can happen? And, what are the 
consequences? These questions allow one to identify, measure, quantify, and evaluate risks and 
their consequences and impacts. 
 
Methodology and Framework: Main goal of the ‘risk assessment’ phase of the report is to 
investigate options for mitigating gas supply disruptions (p 30). These are categorised as 
‘flexibility of supply’; ‘flexibility of demand’; flexibility of infrastructure’ – sub-categorised as 
storage, diversification, interconnections, and EU policies; ‘cooperation with supplier and transit 
countries. From there it discusses extensively the impact of the January 2009 gas crisis on 
member states.  
 
Outcome: offers a generic set of conclusions about the need for more coordination, investment, 
regulation, solidarity, flexibility and emergency response mechanisms. No actual risk assessment 
is performed, rather, only the relevant variables are introduced.   
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Evaluation: The ‘mitigation options’ section (from p. 30) provides a useful way of establishing 
the context for the EC Gas Supply Regulation Risk Assessment.  
 
REACCESS: Risk of energy availability: common corridors for Europe supply security 
 
The REACESS project aims at analysing present policies concerning EU MS and Community 
targets for energy import. Evaluating technical, economical and environmental characteristics of 
present and future energy corridors within Europe and among Europe and the supplying regions 
of the World, taking into account the different typology of infrastructures and technologies 
(railways, pipelines, cables, terminals, ships and other carriers, ..), the flows and the distances 
involved for oil, natural gas, coal, electricity, uranium, biomass and hydrogen (reference to the 
work done within the ENCOURAGED Project and other research activities). 
Introducing suitable parameters and indicators (including technical and socio-economical 
reliability) and cost components (investment, O&M, externalities) incorporating the above 
mentioned information, which may help a global evaluation of supply options (energy vectors, 
infrastructures, origins of the sources) and their impacts on economy, society, energy and 
environment toward sustainability. Identifying main corridors for primary and secondary energy 
carriers to EU27+ Implementing these energy corridors into an adapted version of the pan-EU 
TIMES model (PEM) built in the framework of the NEEDS IP or into other modelling tools. 
Analysing scenarios, in which for the fulfilment of the EU27+ energy needs, the import strategies 
of primary (and secondary) energy carriers compete with the evolution of energy efficiency 
policies (i.e. white certificates for the energy saving), the introduction of new energy schemes 
and the development of renewables, in the framework of the EU environmental targets for 
2030-2050. Some hypotheses related to the energy supply and demand strategies of regions 
outside of Europe will be also assumed, given their potential impacts on the international 
energy prices (e.g. China, India, OPEC, Russia etc.) 
 
Risks on Energy Security of Supply: an exploratory analysis for the researcher
42
  
 
Type: FP7 Project – Risks of Energy Availability; Common Corridors for Europe Supply Security, 
1
st
 Conference proceedings (Athens) 
 
Objective: to underline the importance of risk analysis and minimization in addressing the 
overall energy supply status of the EU.  
 
Domain: European Union, oil and gas 
 
Main concepts used: Risk analysis (e.g. categorisation of the ‘most important risks’ to energy 
supply) 
 
Scope and Variables: assesses/evaluates energy supply security by interpreting historical data. 
 
Methodology and Framework: Categorises and then reviews seven types of risks based on their 
past frequencies and consequences. These are: 
1. Conflicts (war) 
                                                        
42
 Chapter 2 (Flouri, Karakosta, Douka, Flamos) 
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2. Political instability (regime change, protests, revolutions) 
3. Terrorist attacks 
4. Export restriction (embargoes) 
5. Accidents (explosions, leaks, any unintentional interruptions) 
6. Weather conditions (hurricanes, earthquakes, etc) 
7. Monopolistic Practices (cartelisation, etc.) 
The study applies a qualitative assessment of the probability and impact of these related risks.  
 
Outcome: The study concludes that, for natural gas, the probability of Risks 1-4 are low, for 
Risks 5-6 medium, and for Risk 7 is high. On the impact side, Risks 1-2-7 are high, Risks 4 and 5 
are medium, and Risks 3 and 6 are low. 
 
Evaluation: Only does a brief, ad-hoc analysis of past events. Doesn’t mention anything about 
the resilience of the system or how to calculate/mitigate future risks. For all its introductory 
remarks about the need for method to analyse risk, ultimately it provides a slapdash, half-baked 
one.  
 
COUNTERACT: Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist 
ACTivities 
 
Critical infrastructures are those which, if disrupted as a result of a terrorist attack, would have 
an impact of regional, national or international scale on communities and economies. Such an 
attack could be co-ordinated, disrupting several infrastructures directly or through cascade 
effects. COUNTERACT asses and recommend feasible and cost-effective solutions for the 
improvement of security in four key sectors of critical infrastructure: urban public transport, rail 
transport, air transport, maritime transport, freight transport and energy. These sectors have 
been grouped in different clusters:  Surface Passenger Transport - Freight Transport - Air 
Transport – Energy.  
The Counteract energy cluster has provided interesting deliverables: 
 
Estimated Recovery Times for Energy Infrastructures Damaged by Terrorist Attacks  
This study aims at the identification of the duration of critical infrastructure component outages 
after being struck by a terrorist attack. Measures to recover the infrastructure and the supply of 
energy currently in place are analyzed and evaluated to identify where improvements are 
possible. Historically such attacks have taken place within and outside Europe, but the impacts 
were limited. An overview of the natural gas, oil, and electricity systems furthermore gave 
indications that measures to respond to technical failures or weather hazards together with 
spares for maintenance purposes would be sufficient to quickly repair any damage pipelines, 
pylons, or transformers. Applying scenarios reveal that the energy that is lost due to single point 
disruptions like terrorist attacks can be replaced immediately. Recovery times of the 
infrastructure components ranged from 3 months to over 3 years depending on the component 
and the availability of replacements parts. The study recommends taking steps ensuring that 
missing energy from affected infrastructure components due to disruptions can be supplied via 
alternatives over a prolonged period of time and to enhance the national and EU wide 
management of energy crisis situations.  
 
Energy Supply Chain Threat Assessment and Generic Security Guidance 
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This study presents a risk based approach and an operational model to security management. It 
gives an overview and an assessment of the terrorist threat to the energy supply chain. The 
study is designed to allow operators as well as regulators to develop a rational and cost effective 
protection strategy that will secure assets in accordance with threat levels. For the asset 
operators the method provides a solid foundation to establish an overview of the attractiveness 
of their assets with respect to a perpetrator threat, and to facilitate the communication with 
security advisors and authorities. Fundamentally, the perpetrator threat against the energy 
supply chain in Europe has been very low in the past - attacks have not resulted in major 
damage to the targets, reflecting that the perpetrators behind these attacks are leftist or 
separatist groups. So far, al-Qaida or al-Qaida inspired global jihadi terrorists have not targeted 
energy supply chain in Europe. This may reflect that the energy supply chain is not the most 
suitable venue for staging mass casualty attacks. However, al-Qaida’s view on the suitability and 
legitimacy of targeting energy supply chains is evolving. It seems likely that evolving patterns of 
energy dependence will have the unintended effect of sustaining and in some cases increase 
trans-national terrorism. It is reasonable therefore to assume that terrorist interest in such 
targets may grow in the future. The energy supply chain offer many potentially attractive 
terrorist targets, when the political context makes such attacks meaningful to terrorist and 
insurgent groups. The risk based assessment model provided by the study allows the 
stakeholders to priorities actions, and to decide which risks may be tolerated, and which require 
action to control them or remove them. 
 
Terrorism and European Energy Security: Assessing the challange 
This study assesses the challenge from terrorism towards the European energy supply 
infrastructure analyzing the resilience of the infrastructure, targeting patterns worldwide, and 
incentives behind those patterns. The resilience of the energy infrastructure to uncoordinated 
malicious attacks is estimated by assessing past major accidents and attacks. Historical data on 
terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure worldwide are analyzed and terrorist targeting is 
assessed by reviewing the existing literature. The study finds that the current European energy 
infrastructure is quite resilient to single-point incidents. In addition, the analysis on targeting 
data revealed that energy infrastructure is not a preferred target for terrorists in general. 
Terrorists promoting various political causes have reasons to attach less value to energy 
infrastructure than to other potential targets. However, terrorists with a nationalist-separatist 
agenda or possible future groups based on single-issue environmentalist/climate platforms may 
have greater incentives to strike energy infrastructure targets. 
 
INTEG-RISK: Early recognition, monitoring and integrated management of emerging, new 
technology related risks 
 
iNTeg-Risk is a large-scale integrating project aimed at improving the management of emerging 
risks in the innovative industry. In particular in the area of "New production – technologies & 
production networks", security or energy supply and its related emergin risks are considered. 
The project aims at building a new risk management paradigm for emerging risks, which is a set 
of principles supported by a common language, commonly agreed tools & methods and Key 
Performance Indicators integrated into a single framework. 
The project aims at improving early recognition and monitoring of emerging risks, seek to 
reduce accidents caused by them and decrease reaction times if major accidents involving 
emerging risks happen. iNTeg-risk will reach its goals by promoting a EU-wide cross-sectorial life-
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cycle-based integration across all major disciplines, methods and tools as well as through 
integration of all relevant stakeholders.  
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Table 1: Overview table FP6 & FP7 project on risk assessment: 
PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
CONTEXT 
RISK SOURCES RISK ANALYSIS 
RISK 
EVALUATION 
RISK 
TREATMENT 
EURACOM 
Energy 
infrastructures 
(CIP) 
oil, gas, 
electricity 
All hazards: 
accidental 
(human, 
technical, 
natural causes, 
dependencies) 
and deliberate 
(terrorist 
attacks)   
Practical 
evaluation of 
risk:  
R= P x C 
Qualitative  
Probability 
scale 
Risk  ranking, 
qualitative 
Combination 
of risk 
mitigation, 
avoidance and 
acceptance 
SECURE 
Energy:  
oil, gas, coal, 
renewables, 
nuclear, 
electricity 
Technical, 
environmental, 
economic, 
geopolitical 
Evaluation of 
risk: 
R= P x C  
Qualitative and 
quantitative  
Economic costs 
of remediation 
and financial 
aspects of 
policies and 
measures 
Threats and 
impact 
reduction and 
costs 
evaluation 
REACESS 
Energy 
corridors:  
oil, coal, 
natural gas, 
uranium, 
electricity, 
hydrogen, 
biomass  
Technical, 
economical, 
environmental 
Socio political 
risk analysis 
(social risk, 
energy risk, 
political risk, 
economic risk) 
Technological 
risk analysis 
(risk for people 
and 
environment) 
Risk ranking Mitigation 
measures for 
disruption 
(flexibility of 
demand, 
supply, 
infrastructure) 
COUNTERACT 
Energy, 
transport and 
intermodal 
freight (CPI) 
Terrorist 
attacks 
Assets and 
threats 
assessment 
N.A. N.A 
INTEGRISK 
Security of 
energy supply 
as part of 
innovative 
industry (new 
production, 
technologies 
& production 
networks) 
Technical, 
human, 
communication, 
governance 
(Emerging risks) 
IRGC 
Framework 
Risk ranking NO 
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ANNEX 6 
 
Classical and Bayesian estimation 
 
This annex is dedicated to show the most typical and widely used classical and Bayesian 
estimation methods. These may be used to estimate scenario probability and to estimate the 
probability density functions (pdfs) that may be used to characterise the uncertainty about 
random/uncertain model parameters  
Classical inference methods 
Classical inference methods are based on the assumption of having a random sample. The target 
is to determine the PDF that generated the random sample. This process may be divided in 
three steps: 
 
• Model identification 
• Parameter estimation, which is divided in two parts 
o Point estimation 
o Interval estimation 
• Diagnosis of the model 
 
Model identification consists in finding the most appropriate probability model (uniform, 
normal, log-normal, exponential, Weibull, etc.) for the sampled data. This task needs the use of 
graphic tools such as histograms, in addition to the experience in the field under study. 
Furthermore experts in the field will often have an idea of the distributions that could best 
represent the data. This part of the process certainly involves subjective elements. 
Once the probability model has been identified, the parameters need to be determined. Most 
probability models are characterised by a set of parameters (parametric models), as for example 
the mean, μ, and the standard deviation, σ, in a normal (Gaussian) probability model. Estimation 
is done via techniques of point estimation. These techniques allow identifying a best choice for 
those parameters. Identifying best choices does not mean that those are the only acceptable 
ones; other similar values could also be acceptable. A measure of error or of likely alternatives is 
also needed. This is provided by interval estimates. 
The last step consists in checking that the hypotheses considered in the whole process were 
correct. Three hypotheses are normally used: the type of probability model, the independence 
between the different observations and the homogeneity of the sample.  
In the following pages attention focuses on point estimation (first bullet in step 2). 
 
POINT ESTIMATION 
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The best-known and most widely used methods are the Maximum Likelihood Method and the 
Method of Moments. The main shortcoming of all these methods is their requirement of sample 
sizes to get good quality estimates.  In practical situations with real engineering facilities it may 
be quite difficult to get the required sample size.  
 
Method of moments 
 
Method of Moments is probably the oldest inferential method to estimate the parameters of a 
PDF. K. Pearson developed the method of moments by the end of 19
th
 century. The idea is quite 
simple. It consists in taking as an estimator of a parameter its equivalent sample quantity. So, 
the sample mean is the estimator for the mean, the sample variance is the estimator for the 
variance and so on. 
 
Maximum Likelihood method  
 
The Maximum Likelihood Method is the most widely used and most powerful estimation 
method in the classical context. Let us assume that we wish to study a random variable X 
(representing a parameter affected by uncertainty) of a known distribution function type f(X|θ, 
but of unknown parameter θ. In order to estimate θ we take a random 
sample ),...,,( 21 nXXX=X , which is assumed to be a random vector, whose components are 
independent and identically distributed (iid), so that its joint probability density function is 
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It is important to notice that, in this expression, under the classical view, before sampling, θ is 
unknown, but has an assigned value that determines what regions of X are more likely and 
what regions are less likely. So, this is a function whose unknowns are X . This is the meaning 
before sampling. As soon as the sample is available, X is known, while θ  remains unknown. The 
objective is to determine what value, among all the possible values of θ, makes the sample 
actually obtained the most likely one. The problem is hence to find the value of θ for which the 
function defined in (6.1) attains its maximum value. As it is convenient to look at the problem 
after getting the sample, expression (6.1) is usually written as  
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which means that, after sampling, the probability density function of the sample vector is 
changed into a function of the unknown parameter θ. ‘L’ stands for ‘Likelihood’. From a practical 
point of view, the function whose maximum is actually computed is not L, but its 
logarithm )( Xθl . Both functions reach a maximum at the same point since the transformation to 
get one from the other one is a monotonic transformation.  
As an example, let ),...,,( 21 nXXX=X be a sample of size n of a Gaussian random variable whose 
variance σ
2
 is known. We wish to estimate the mean μ of the random variable under study.  
Under these circumstances, the likelihood function is 
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whose logarithm is 
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In order to compute the value of μ for which this expression reaches a maximum, we compute 
its first derivative with respect to μ 
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The maximum is obtained when this expression equals zero, which happens for the value 
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The reader may check, by computing the second derivative that, indeed, the likelihood function 
reaches a maximum when µµ ˆ=  (second derivative is less than zero when µµ ˆ= ). The method 
may also be applied when a PDF is defined through a vector of parameters; in that case the 
usual rules for maximizing a multi-parameter function must be applied (to equal first partial 
derivatives to zero and to check conditions imposed on the Hessian matrix evaluated at the 
point where first partial derivatives are zero). The method provides a single value as an 
estimate. If needed, a confidence interval with the desired degree of confidence, may be 
obtained using interval estimation theory.  
The maximum likelihood method has several properties that makes it the most widely used 
estimation method Mood et al. (1974): 
• The estimators obtained through this method are asymptotically unbiased (the limits of 
their expected values when the sample size tends to infinite are the true values of the 
parameters). 
• They are asymptotically normal since their distributions become normal when the 
sample size tends to infinite. 
• They are asymptotically efficient; for large sample sizes, they are the most accurate 
estimators. 
• They are sufficient since they summarise all the relevant information contained in the 
sample. 
• They are invariant; if θˆ is the maximum likelihood estimator of θ, and )(' θθ f= , 
then )ˆ(θf  is the maximum likelihood estimator of θ´. 
• Table 6.1 provide a summary of most used probability laws. The binomial, poisson, 
exponential and gamma distributions are the most suitable ones for estimating 
scenario probabilities.  
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Table 6.1.- The most useful probability distributions functions, their parameters and 
their maximum likelihood estimators.  
• Distrib
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• PDF • Paramet
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• r= number of events 
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etc. surface,  etc.) 
 
*The solutions of this system of equations, where ψ stands for the digamma function, 
are the maximum likelihood estimators. 
†
c is estimated recursively from the second 
equation, later on its estimate is substituted in the first one in order to get the estimator 
of α. 
 
 
 
The Bayesian update of information 
 
From all what has been discussed so far, we may deduce that two interpretations of probability 
may be used in risk analysis and performance assessment: the subjectivist (Bayesian) 
interpretation for one-of-a-type events and propositions and the frequentist for repetitive 
events. Though effectively, both cases could be included in the first one (Bayesian 
interpretation) for, if information about relative frequencies is available, the requirement of 
coherence will force subjectivists to assign probabilities very close to the observed relative 
frequencies.  
 
The Bayesian interpretation of probability makes Bayes’ formula a powerful tool to update 
degrees of belief when new information is available about an event or a proposition. Let H be 
the knowledge of a person (expert), and let { } Iiiz ∈ be a partition of the sample space of events. 
The Bayesian probability attributed by an expert to a given event kz is )( HzP k . The acquisition of 
a set of new evidence H’ produces a change in the probability given by Bayes’ formula 
 
)'(
)(),'()',(
HHP
HzPzHHP
HHzP kkk
⋅
= ,                                                         (6.7) 
 
where )',( HHzP k  is the ‘a posteriori’ probability of kz , )( HzP k  is the ‘a priori’ probability 
of kz and ),'( kzHHP  is the likelihood of evidence conditional on the knowledge H  and the 
occurrence of event kz . )'( HHP is the probability of new evidence conditional on previous 
knowledge, which may be considered a normalising factor, since the sum of expressions like 
(6.7) over the whole partition must be 1 (equivalently, the sum of the a posteriori probabilities 
of all the partition elements must be 1). That probability is given by 
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and may be ignored in any intermediate computation. So, equation (6.7) may be written as 
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)(),'()',( HzPzHHPHHzP kkk ⋅∝ ,                                                        (6.9) 
 
which means that the a posteriori probability is proportional to the a priori probability and to 
the likelihood of evidence. 
 
Two remarkable results are obtained from (6.7 – 6.9). If the a priori probability of an event is 
zero, the a posteriori probability will remain zero, even though the evidence against it could be 
very strong. So, much care should be taken when providing a priori probabilities. Null a priori 
probabilities should be avoided, unless total evidence about the impossibility of the events or 
propositions under study is available. In English literature this is called Cromwell’s statement
43
. 
The second result is related to the existence of strong evidence. In that case, likelihood will be 
completely dominant and the a priori probability will be almost irrelevant (a posteriori 
probability and likelihood will be almost equal). This is the case of large sample sizes, for which 
relative frequencies and Bayesian probabilities will be almost equal. 
 
Suppose we suspect a coin is not balanced (probabilities of getting head and tail are different), 
then we toss it n times. Before starting the experiments we have no reliable information about 
the probability p of getting a head, so we choose a non-informative prior distribution )(0 ppi , for 
example a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The prior distribution describes our state of 
knowledge about the probability that we want to study. The chosen distribution means that we 
know nothing at all about p, that is why we consider any possible value as likely as any other one 
(uniform distribution) and all the values that a probability may take (from 0 to 1). Suppose that the 
result of the experiment is r heads and n-r tails. This empirical evidence is used in Bayes formula to 
update )(0 ppi  in order to obtain a new (posterior) distribution for p 
 
)()1()( 01 pppp rnr pipi ⋅−∝ −                                                   (6.10) 
 
where the likelihood associated to the empirical evidence is obtained from the well-known 
formula for a Bernouilli process. When n is large (strong evidence), the likelihood is almost null 
everywhere except in a small interval around p=r/n, where it reaches its peak. As an example, if 
n=30 and r=5, we obtain the following (posterior) distribution for p 
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43
 Gentlemen, I beseech ye, think ye, in the bowels of Christ, that ye may be wrong. Sir Oliver Cromwell 
addressing Parliament around 1651. 
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Figure 6.1 shows )(0 ppi  and )(1 ppi  for this example. When the prior distribution is non-
informative, the posterior distribution is exclusively determined by the data (likelihood and 
posterior distributions are equal). The posterior distribution is significantly different from 0 around 
p=5/30≈0.17. So, a coherent person, whose knowledge includes the observation of frequencies 
obtained from many experiments, will assign subjective probabilities close to the observed 
frequencies. 
 
 
Figure 6.1.- A priori (prior) distribution, a posteriori (posterior) distribution 
for the unbalanced coin example. The likelihood distribution is the same as 
the posterior. 
 
 
Bayesian inferential methods are most used under conditions of scarcity of data. The main steps 
of the formal process are similar to the steps of a classical inferential process: The selection of 
the probability model, the estimation of parameters and the diagnosis of the model. The main 
difference is in the estimation process, which is subject to the use of Bayes formula, as 
explained above. In the next paragraphs is an example of Bayesian estimation. 
Let us assume a random variable X  whose pdf is )( θXf . This pdf is completely defined by the 
parameterθ , that is unknown and we want to estimate it. In order to start this estimation 
process, under the Bayesian framework, the parameter θ  is considered as a random variable 
characterised through an a priori distribution )( Hθpi . The a priori distribution provides 
information about the values the person/expert expects θ could likely take. In order to improve 
our knowledge aboutθ , we take a sample - evidence - ),...,,( 21 nXXX=X , which will have 
∏
=
=
n
i i
XfHP
1
)(),( θθX  as a likelihood function. Applying Bayes’ formula provides the a 
posteriori distribution to be assigned toθ : 
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)(),(),( HHPH θpiθθpi ⋅∝ XX ,                                                         (6.12) 
 
which is a new pdf.  
 
Let us assume the specific case of a Gaussian random variable X . Let us also assume that we do 
not know its mean, µ, though we know its variance, 2σ . Let us assume that, given our knowledge 
about it, we think that µ should have some value close to 0µ , let us also assume that µ could be, 
equally likely, larger or smaller than 0µ , and the further away from it the less likely. Under these 
conditions, a Gaussian a priori pdf forµ , with mean 0µ  and variance 20σ , could be justified. So that 
)( Hµpi ∼ ),( 200 σµN . Given a sample taken from the studied variable, its associated likelihood 
would be: 
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When putting this expression into (6.13) and after some computations, we obtain as an a 
posteriori distribution for µ 
 
),( HXµpi  ∼ ),( 2nnN σµ ,                                                                    (6.14) 
 
where nµ  and 2nσ  are    
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A priori, µ was considered to take values around 0µ , while after getting the information contained 
in the sample, values considered likely are those around nµ . Additionally, the larger the sample 
size n, the closer nµ  and the sample mean, nX , will be (the larger n  the larger the information 
contained in the sample is, while the a priori information remains constant). 2−nσ is the accuracy 
of the estimation (the sum of the accuracy of the a priori distribution, 20/1 σ , and the sample 
accuracy, 2/σn ). The larger the a priori knowledge and the larger the sample size are, the larger 
the accuracy (the smaller the variance) of the a posteriori knowledge aboutµ. Figure 6.2 shows 
the normalised likelihood, and the a priori and the a posteriori pdfs assuming the following data: 
22 =σ , 140 =µ , 20 =σ  and )17 ,13 ,8 ,23 ,15 ,3(−=X . As previously described, the mean of the a 
posteriori distribution, 43.12=nµ , is between the mean of the a priori distribution, 140 =µ , and 
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the point where the likelihood function reaches its maximum, 17.12=nX . With the classical 
Maximum Likelihood Method, the estimate would be: 17.12ˆ == nXµ . 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2.- A priori distribution, a posteriori distribution and likelihood 
function for the example of estimation of a Normal (Gaussian) random 
variable. 
 
 
The validity of this estimation method is supported by: 
 
1) its consistency with the way human beings learn from experience, and  
2) by its convergence to the results provided by the Maximum Likelihood Method 
when the sample size increases (after analysing the first expression in (6.15), the 
reader may check that when sample size increases, the mean of the a posteriori 
distribution converges to the sample mean, which is the estimator of μ provided 
by the Maximum Likelihood Method), independent of the election of the a priori 
pdf, except in the aforementioned case of null a priori probabilities. 
 
Much more information on classical and Bayesian estimation is available in the statistical 
literature, inter alia 
Casella, G. and Berger, R.L. (1990). Statistical inference. Duxbury Press. 
Box, G.E.P. and Tiao, G.C. (1973). Bayesian inference in statistical analysis. Wiley Classics Library. 
Wiley. 
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ANNEX 7 
 
Expert Judgement protocols and techniques 
 
Expert Judgement (EJ) has been used during roughly the last seventy years in different areas of 
science, technology, weather forecasting, strategic planning, economy and many other fields as 
a reasonable way to assess uncertainties about events and variables when the source of 
uncertainty is lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty). Several structured protocols and 
techniques have been proposed and improved thanks to the experience acquired in many 
applications. 
 
In the following pages a short description is given of the most used EJ techniques to assign 
probabilities to events and probability distributions to uncertain parameters; a well known 
structured EJ protocol is also described. At the end of this annex is a list of references. 
 
Techniques to assess probabilities and probability distributions 
 
EJ techniques may be used to estimate probabilities of events and probability distributions of 
continuous and discrete parameters. The next two sections are dedicated to these techniques. 
 
TECHNIQUES TO ESTIMATE PROBABILITIES OF EVENTS 
 
Subjects are not very used to making statements in terms of probabilities, with the exception of 
persons with some expertise in probability and statistics, and gamblers. Some precision is 
expected from experts, and preferably they are expected to distinguish between low 
probabilities such as 10
-3
 and 10
-4
. In some cases, even if they are able to distinguish between 
similar likelihoods, perhaps they are not able to express them in the typical scale between 0 and 
1. That is why some techniques have been developed to make easier that translation from 
qualitative opinions to quantitative statements. The techniques may be classified as direct and 
indirect. Direct techniques may change the scale used to assess probabilities in order to adapt it 
to the capability of the expert. Indirect techniques use the preferences of experts between 
different alternatives to derive probabilities and are very useful in helping subjects that are not 
familiar with the concept of probability. 
 
Direct techniques 
 
The most straightforward technique of assessing a probability is to estimate it directly, but this 
is not always found as the most suitable way by some subjects; other alternative scales may be 
used. Two of these scales are the odds and the log-odds, which are 
 
P
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=
1
                                                                   (7.1) 
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The odd is the quotient between the probability of the event and the probability of the 
complement of that event. The log-odd is the decimal logarithm of the odd. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 
show the scales used when those magnitudes are used to make probabilistic statements (the 
range of the odd scale is ),0[ +∞  while the range of the log-odd scale is ),( +∞−∞ . 
 
Some subjects are more capable of making probabilistic statements when they use the jargon of 
gamblers; they express their uncertainty about events via expressions such as ‘h against k in 
favour of the occurrence of the event’. When this jargon is used, the two following identities 
proceed 
 
kh
hP
+
=                                                                      (7.3) 
and 
k
h
odd =                                                                          (7.4) 
 
where P is the probability of the event. When using this scale, a probability 10
-3
 would be 
formulated as ‘roughly 1 against 1000 in favour of the occurrence of the event’ (strictly speaking 
1 against 999). 
  
The use of odds and log-odds involves stretching the scale where probabilities are assessed, 
which should lead to an improved resolution. When the usual (linear) probability scale is used, it 
is not so easy to distinguish between probabilities such as 0.48 and 0.50, giving preference to 
‘nicer’ numbers, 0.50 in this case.  
 
Figure 7.1.- Relation between probability and 
odd. 
Figure 7.2.- Relation between Log-odd and 
probability (both in log scale). 
 
Indirect techniques 
 
   
 84 
Savage (1954) believes that direct methods introduce large errors (discrepancies between 
assessed probabilities and honest beliefs) because subjects are not good probability assessors; 
this is the reason why he proposes using methods that do not mention probabilities explicitly. 
Savage proposes a technique called ‘certainty equivalence’. This technique consists in proposing 
to the expert a game: he/she will get an economic reward if the event he/she is asked the 
probability of occurs; otherwise he/she gets no reward. Then he/she is asked up to what 
quantity of money he/she would be willing to pay in order to participate in the game. The 
probability of the event is then assessed as the quotient between the maximum quantity of 
money he/she would be willing to pay to be allowed to participate in the game and the 
economic reward. An equivalent alternative is to propose the expert to choose between the 
next two options: getting y Euros if the event happens and getting nothing if it does not happen 
or getting a quantity x (not higher than y) independently of the occurrence or not of the event. 
The quantity x is increased until the point when the subject has no clear preference between 
both choices. The probability assessed would be the solution of the equation 0)1( ⋅−+⋅= PyPx , 
which is yxP /= . 
De Finetti (1974) does not trust this type of technique for assessing probabilities because, in his 
opinion, probabilities become biased by the attitude of the subject towards gambling. As an 
alternative he proposes a technique called the ‘reference lottery’. The subject is confronted with 
two lotteries. In the first one he/she gets a reward x with probability P and a smaller reward y 
with probability 1-P, while in the second one he gets the reward x if the event A happens and y if 
it does not happen (see figure 7.3). The subject has to choose one of them. P is varied until 
when the subject has no clear preference between both choices, the value of P at that moment 
is the probability assessed by him/her for the event. The fact that the reward is the same in both 
lotteries is designed to remove biases produced by different attitudes towards gambling. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3.- De Finetti’s reference lottery 
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Raiffa (1968), due to the same reasons that brought De Finetti to propose the reference lottery, 
proposed the ‘reference urn’ method. The subject is encouraged to imagine an urn that contains 
balls with two different colours. The subject will be asked what ratio between the balls of both 
colours best corresponds with his opinion about the occurrence of a given event. Although this 
technique and the reference lottery seem appropriate to be used with subjects that do not have 
a good background in probability, many analysts find them tedious and difficult to apply in real 
expert judgement applications; they consider them useful only if either they are used to assess 
only a few probabilities or to introduce probabilistic concepts in the first steps of a protocol. 
 
TECHNIQUES TO ASSESS PROBABILITY DISTRBUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN PARAMETERS 
 
The techniques to help experts in assessing probability distributions may be divided into 
techniques targeting continuous distributions and techniques targeting discrete distributions. 
The techniques used to assess continuous distributions are based on the assessment of 
probabilities of discrete events such as ‘the parameter value lies between this and that values’.  
 
Discrete distributions 
 
In the general case, experts need to assess the probabilities of n different possible values of the 
parameter under study. These n values may be considered as n different mutually exclusive 
events. When n is too large, say 10 or larger, it is convenient to group them in a smaller set. The 
first step is to ask the expert to rank them from the most to the least probable and to provide a 
rationale to justify such ranking. Later on, the individual probabilities are assessed. Usually the 
expert is asked firstly about the probability or the odd of the most likely value. In case the expert 
does not feel comfortable giving his/her assessment in terms of either probabilities or odds, 
other alternative techniques may be used. 
The fact that the probability of all possible values has to add up to 1 makes it unavoidable to 
estimate the probabilities of at least n-1 values, the n
th
 may be deduced from the normalisation 
condition, yet it is advisable to understand the whole rationale of the expert, asking him the n 
probabilities, checking the normalisation condition later on. If the estimated probabilities do not 
add 1, it is always interesting to find out the reasons for such inconsistency. Normalisation may 
always be easily achieved, the normalisation constant k being obtained by solving the equation 
1)( 1 =∑ == inii pk . More sophisticated normalization techniques have been proposed by Lindley et al. 
(1979). 
Continuous distributions 
 
Two techniques are available to assess continuous distributions for uncertain continuous 
parameters: the quantile technique and the interval technique. The first of them is based on 
fixing probabilities and asking experts about the corresponding values of the parameter, while 
the second one consists in fixing values and asking about probabilities. Sometimes both 
techniques are combined in the same elicitation session. Other more complicated techniques, 
which require higher than average statistical skills can also be used, but some authors believe 
that these are not always well understood by subjects.  
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• The quantile technique 
 
Given a random variable X with distribution function F(x), its quantile q is the value xq such that 
X takes values equal to or smaller than it with probability q, i.e.: F(xq)=q. xq may also be called 
percentile 100·q %. The quantile 0 is the lower bound of the parameter under study and the 
quantile 1 is the upper bound. Quantile 0.5 is the median. The cumulative distribution function 
of X consists in plotting q versus xq. 
 
The application of these techniques begins by asking the expert about the upper and lower 
bounds of the parameter. If the expert is not able to provide such absolute bounds, then 
analysts ask about quantiles 0.99 and 0.01, or 0.95 and 0.05, depending on how comfortable the 
expert feels in estimating extreme values. It is important to combine these direct questions with 
others oriented to counteract overconfidence. These kinds of questions should encourage the 
expert to think of conditions under which the parameter could take values outside the 
boundaries previously assessed and the likelihood of such conditions. It can be very beneficial 
for the analysts to help the expert in imagining such situations either by ‘digging’ into the 
problem or providing examples that came up in similar expert judgement applications. Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1978) note that experts frequently make good use of this type of help. In general, 
thinking of alternative conditions help experts in broadening their uncertainty ranges. 
 
Once the upper and lower bounds, or some given extreme quantiles have been assessed, then 
the analyst asks about the median. The expert is asked about a value that could be equally likely 
smaller or larger than the actual value of the parameter. It is important to see how far this 
estimate is from the previously estimated bounds or extreme quantiles. If the estimate is more 
or less in the middle, this could mean that the expert is just taking the mean of the extreme 
values or considering some kind of implicit symmetry. Medians too close to some of the bounds 
could also indicate a poor original definition of the bounds. The expert should be asked about 
the reasons for providing that estimate for the median. Later on, quantiles 0.25 and 0.75 are 
addressed using similar questions. More quantiles may be assessed, but five quantiles are 
usually enough to draw an approximate cumulative distribution. The shape of the curve should 
be discussed with the expert in order to uncover potential inconsistencies. It is also useful to 
draw the pdf and show it to the expert, since features like the symmetry or lack of symmetry of 
the distribution are easier to see in the pdf than in the cumulative distribution. 
 
It is important to address extreme quantiles and absolute bounds as the first steps of the 
elicitation session. In the first applications of this technique the bisection method became very 
popular. It consists of asking firstly for the median, asking then for the 25% and the 75% and so 
on. Nowadays this method has been abandoned because it was experimentally shown that 
asking firstly for the median converts this estimate into an anchor that quite frequently led to 
overconfidence. 
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• The interval technique 
 
In order to apply this technique, the analyst selects some values and asks the expert about the 
probability that the parameter is located within the different intervals defined using those 
values. There are two types of intervals to define: open intervals and closed intervals. In the first 
case the analyst selects a point and asks the expert the probability of the value of the parameter 
being smaller (or larger) than it. In the second case the analyst selects two points and asks the 
expert the probability that the value of the parameter be inside the defined interval. If the 
expert finds difficulties in giving his/her opinions in terms of probabilities, the analysts can help 
him/her using indirect techniques. 
 
In both cases (open and closed intervals), in order to avoid overconfidence due to introducing an 
anchor given by a first estimate about a central value, the analyst starts by posing questions 
related to very extreme values, that should correspond to quantiles such as 0.01,0.05, 0.95 and 
0.99, or even to absolute bounds. Later on, some other interior points are selected, usually 
between three and seven, depending on the degree of accuracy required, and the analyst asks 
the expert questions based on them. Each answer given by the expert must be supported by 
some rationale, and the expert should be confronted with conflicting data and with hypothetical 
situations not considered or mentioned in his/her rationale. When the closed interval option has 
been selected, another convenient task to do is to ask the expert to rank from the most likely to 
the least likely a number of intervals whose limits are set using the group of values selected. 
With the information obtained from the expert the cumulative distribution functions and the 
corresponding pdfs are built and results are discussed to check consistency. 
An Expert Judgement protocol: the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) protocol 
This is the first structured protocol developed to obtain individual expert judgements and can be 
considered as the precursor of most of the others. It was developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s by 
the Decision Analysis Group of the SRI (Stanford University). The protocol was originally divided 
in five phases, though it was further enlarged, see Merkhofer (1988), after the dissolution of the 
Decision Analysis Group. In this protocol, the process to obtain the opinion of the experts is 
considered as the joint task of an analyst and an expert. A description of the protocol follows: 
• Phase 1: Motivating 
 
The objective of this phase is a first contact with the expert in order to inform him/her about 
what is expected from him/her and to find out if there is any risk of encountering motivational 
biases. 
Firstly, the analyst explains to the expert the general problem to be solved and the context in 
which his/her opinions are meaningful. The expert is informed about the importance of the 
parameter or event under study, he/she is also informed about the way the opinions provided 
will be used within the general problem. Then the expert is informed about the fact that the 
objective is not to forecast a single value but to characterise the uncertainty about the 
parameter of interest.  
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• Phase 2: Structuring 
 
The purpose of this phase is twofold. On the one hand, the objective is to decompose the 
quantity of interest as a function of several other variables in order to simplify the task of 
assessing distribution functions, on the other hand the objective is to obtain information about 
the way the expert approaches the problem, identifying implicit hypotheses that were unknown 
to the analyst and that could introduce bias into the assessment results. This phase may be 
divided into three steps: 
1. To set an accurate definition for the parameter under study: The parameter under study 
must be precisely defined.  
2. Study the possibility of decomposing the quantity of interest: Decomposing the quantity 
of interest may help in counteracting the effects of motivational biases. Working on low-
level variables may help in disconnecting an expert’s assessments from his/her personal 
interests, which are based on high-level variables, or attitudes towards risk and 
uncertainty.  
3. Explicitly set all hypotheses to be used by the expert: The objective is to uncover all 
implicit and explicit hypotheses considered by the expert in his/her assessment. A useful 
method of uncovering implicit hidden hypothesis is to ask him/her what he/she would 
like to insure against. In other words, if he/she were allowed to take insurance on 
certain events that could make his/her estimates wrong, what would be those events? 
Finally, the units to be used in the assessment for the quantity of interest or for any low-
level variable that comes up in the decomposition process must be clearly stated. 
Experts should be allowed to choose the units they prefer to use. 
 
• Phase 3: Conditioning 
 
The purpose of this phase is to draw out into expert’s immediate consciousness all relevant 
knowledge related to the uncertain quantity. Usually, when dealing with a problem, we have 
generic (or distributional or base information) and case-specific information. It is important to 
realise both types of information and combine them adequately. Usually subjects ignore generic 
information and base their opinions on case-specific information. In order to avoid this 
situation, the authors propose to ask experts the following question: In your opinion, what 
would be the answer to this question given by another person with no case-specific 
information? The answer provided by experts could be taken as a prior distribution that could 
be combined with the opinion based on only case specific information to get the posterior 
distribution through the use of Bayes’ formula. In this phase experts are also warned about the 
risk of using data with no predictive capability to make predictions. They propose to use a 
method suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1982) to correct such kind of problems, which in 
fact implies a regression to the mean. These authors propose the following measure of 
predictability 12 −⋅= ρτ , where ρ  is the correlation coefficient (in general a subjective estimate) 
between predictions and outcomes. Then, if the expert provides an estimate Y, when the mean of 
the prediction is Yµ  the estimate should be corrected towards the value )( YY Y µτµ −⋅+ . It must 
be pointed out that this correction can be used only for absolute values of ρ  above 0.5. In any 
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other case (weak correlations described by correlations coefficients between –0.5 and 0.5) the 
suggestion of the authors is to use the mean (extreme case of regression to the mean).  
In this phase experts are encouraged to think of scenarios that could produce either extremely 
high or extremely low values of the quantity and think about their likelihood. If needed, experts 
could be invited to do a calibration exercise. 
• Phase 4: Encoding 
 
This is the phase where the analyst and the expert together build the distribution function. The 
techniques used in this protocol are the quantile and the interval techniques, and the 
combination of both. Experts are allowed to choose the scale they prefer to make their 
probabilistic statement (probabilities, odds, log-odds, bets, etc.). Indirect techniques such are 
also accepted. 
Consistency of expert’s assessments must be checked from time to time by asking the same or 
similar questions in different ways. Lack of consistency may be also detected by drawing the 
estimates provided by the expert on graph paper. In some cases, the first points lie on one line 
while subsequent points lie on a shifted different one. Usually this means that after a given 
point in the encoding session the expert started taking into account in the assessment some 
additional information. Under these circumstances it could be convenient to repeat the 
encoding session. 
• Phase 5: Verification 
 
The objective of this phase is to check that the expert agrees with the distribution generated 
during the encoding phase. The pdf and the cumulative distribution are plotted. Reviewing 
those plots could highlight some effect not foreseen by the expert that could warrant some 
further discussion. The final step is to ask the expert if he/she would be willing to bet on his/her 
estimates. If the expert does not feel comfortable with the distributions generated, some 
phases of the protocol should be repeated, at least the encoding phase. 
• Phase 6: Aggregation 
 
This phase was added after the dissolution of the Decision Analysis Group. The original protocol 
was designed to elicit judgements from only one expert. In many cases it is necessary to gather 
the judgment from several experts. In that case aggregation would be necessary. The 
aggregation should be done by mathematical means, preferably using a linear pool, see Bolado 
et al. (2009), either with equal or with unequal weights.  
More information about EJ structured protocols and techniques may be found in Bolado 
et al. (2009). 
 
References 
 
R. Bolado, A. Badea and M. Poole (2009). Review of  Expert Judgement Methods for Assigning 
PDF’s. 
PAMINA milestone M2.2.A.3.L.J.  
 
   
 90 
B. De Finetti (1974). Theory of Probability. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
H.J. Einhorn and R.M. Hogarth (1978). Confidence in Judgement: Persistence of the Illusion of 
Validity. Psychological Review, Vol. 85, No. 5.  
D.V. Lindley, A. Tversky and R.V. Brown (1979). On the Reconciliation of Probability Assessments. 
Journal of the Royal statistical Society, series A (1979), 142, Part 2, pp. 146-180. 
M.W. Merkhofer (1988). Quantifying Judgemental Uncertainty: Methodology, Experiences and 
Insights. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-17, No.5, pp 741-752.  
H. Raiffa (1968). Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choice under Uncertainty. Addison-
Wesley. 
L.J. Savage (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 91 
ANNEX 8 
 
 
 Relevant issues for gas market modelling 
A categorization 
 
 
The energy system is a formidably complex and crucially important element of the overall 
economic-social-technical system. It can be described in a number of different ways, and 
through the languages and characterizations of a number of different disciplines, including at 
least the so called ‘4Es’: energy, engineering, economy, environment. 
A ‘system’ approach attempts to include all the significant elements of the system under study 
and emphasizes: a) the relations and interactions between them, b) the synergies and the 
integral nature of the system. The use of mathematical models/tools makes possible to assess 
quantitatively the impact of choices. The use of formal models ensures consistency, 
reproducibility and transparency (relationships are specified in formal terms and all variables are 
measured in consistent units). 
However, there are several different categories of models. The choice among them can be done 
only after considering the type of policy to be evaluated, or more generally the type of analysis 
to be developed.  
 
Identification and categorization of the relevant issues for quantitative assessments of energy 
security 
Aim of the framework presented here is to clarify the methodological requirements to address 
different energy security threats and different insurance strategies, each one characterised by 
its own specific characteristics. Once the threats have been categorised (see Main Report, 3.2.1) 
the next step is the identification of the methodological requirements which must be taken into 
account to assess any threat category. To this end, the relevant issues for modelling the various 
aspects of energy security are here identified and briefly discussed. The issues which are related 
have been grouped by using the criteria normally adopted to categorize energy models: three 
main wide dimensions (plus several sub-dimensions) have been defined. These three 
dimensions make possible to clearly contrast the two conventional modelling approaches (Top-
Down/Bottom-Up), at the same time providing a useful framework for the analysis. 
Following Hourcade et al.
44
, the characteristics of conventional TD and BU models can be 
synthesised by placing them inside a three-dimensional graph: “to be particularly useful, an 
energy-environment policy model should technologically explicit, behaviorally realistic and have 
macroeconomic feedbacks. This categorization of energy-economy models is useful to identify 
the main “model families”, but it still falls short of being a framework to identify the 
methodological requirements for energy security assessments. To this end, in the following the 
three main dimensions adopted above have been exploded and partially renamed. The 
renaming just gives a more general significance to macro-economic completeness and 
                                                        
44
 Hourcade et al., 2006, Hybrid Modeling: New Answers to Old Challenges, The Energy Journal, Special 
Issue on Hybrid modeling of energy-environment policies: reconciling bottom-up and top-down. 
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technological explicitness, by using the wider concepts of system boundary and granularity. Each 
of these dimensions has then been exploded, in order to cover all the issues which are relevant 
for assessing energy security, not only in a modelling framework but in any quantitative and 
rigorous framework. Aim of this “modelling perspective” is to help identify the elements of the 
system that must be considered in any specific assessment, making evident what are the 
characteristics of the “ideal” tool to be selected and used. 
 
Table 8.1 – Framework for a classification of energy-economy models 
 
Main dimension Sub-dimension Possible options 
Sector Economy/Macro, Energy System, Energy sector 
Market Multi-energy markets, Single-energy market 
Geographical scope Global/Multi-country, EU/Multi-country, Regional, Country 
Scope/System 
boundary 
 
Dynamics / Time horizon Short-term, Medium-term, Long-term / Static, Dynamic 
Technology representation black box, detailed 
Supply Chain Upstream, Storage, Supply, End-uses 
Environmental detail Emissions, Water, Biodiversity 
Infrastructures and 
network 
Network type, Transportation type, None 
Energy technology 
transition 
AEEI (Exogenous), Endogenous, None 
Granularity 
 
Time step Hours, Intra-day, Day, Week, Season, Year 
Market description / 
imperfections 
Perfect competition, Strategic behaviour 
Agents behavoiur Perfect rationality, Bounded rationality, Not considered 
Price formation Endogenous, Exogenous, Not considered 
Realism 
 
Out-of-equilibrium 
dynamics 
yes, no 
 
 
Existing quantitative tools/models; a categorization 
After having identified and categorized the issues which are relevant for the gas market 
analysis/modelling (Table 8.1), Table 8.2 uses the same framework to classify some existing 
quantitative tools/models used to analyze energy/gas security issues. This survey does not aim 
to be comprehensive. Its aim is instead to show how the wide range of models available in the 
main literature can be differentiated on the basis of the theoretical framework proposed above. 
As the choice of the issues to be simulated are strictly country/region dependent, any Member 
State can either carry out its assessment by developing a model with the desired characteristics 
or consider the possibility to use one of the existing models. 
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Table 8.2 - Clarifications/definition of the aim(s) of the regulation (and of its possible measures) 
 
   
Model 
Name 
Institutio
n 
Sector Market 
Geograp
hical 
scope 
Dynamics 
/ Time 
horizon 
Techno
logy 
repres
entatio
n  
Supply 
Chain 
Envirome
ntal 
detail 
Infrastr
uctures 
and 
networ
k 
Energy 
technolo
gy 
transition 
Time 
step 
Market 
descripti
on / 
imperfect
ions 
Agents 
behavoiu
r 
Price 
formatio
n 
Out-of-
equilib
rium 
dynami
cs 
Macro-
econome
tric 
E3MG/
E3ME 
Cambridg
e 
Econome
trics 
Un.Camb
ridge 
Economy
/Macro 
Multi-
energy 
market
s 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term/Dyn
amic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Final Final 
Demand 
emissions - 
AEEI 
(Exogeno
us) 
year 
imperfect 
competiti
on 
Bounded 
rationalit
y? 
Endogen
ous 
yes 
GEM-
E3 
CES-
KULeuve
n 
Economy
/Macro 
Multi-
energy 
market
s 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term/Stat
ic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Final Final 
Demand 
emissions - 
AEEI 
(Exogeno
us) 
year 
perfect 
competiti
on 
Perfect 
rationalit
y 
Endogen
ous 
  
Macroe
conomic 
models 
CGE 
GTAP-E 
Purdue 
Univ., 
USA 
Economy
/Macro 
Multi-
energy 
market
s 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term/Stat
ic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Final Final 
Demand 
emissions - 
AEEI 
(Exogeno
us) 
year 
perfect 
competiti
on 
Perfect 
rationalit
y 
Endogen
ous 
  
POLES 
IEPE, 
France 
energy 
sector 
multi-
energy 
market
s 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
emissions transp. 
Endogen
ous 
Intra-
day / 
Season
s 
perfect 
competio
n 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
Endogen
ous 
no 
PRIME
S 
Univ. of 
Athens, 
Greece 
energy 
sector 
multi-
energy 
market
s 
EU/Multi-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box + 
detail  
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
emissions transp. 
Endogen
ous 
Intra-
day / 
Season
s 
perfect 
competio
n 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
Endogen
ous 
no 
ETP IEA 
energy 
sector 
multi-
energy 
market
s 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
tech-
by-tech 
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
emissions transp. 
Endogen
ous 
Intra-
day / 
Season
s 
perfect 
competio
n 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
Endogen
ous 
no 
Energy 
system 
models 
 
TIAM-
PET -
RECOR 
FP7 proj. 
REACCES
S 
energy 
sector 
multi-
energy 
market
s 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
tech-
by-tech 
Upstream, 
Transform., 
Storage, 
Supply, 
emissions 
networ
k/trans
portati
on (?) 
Endogen
ous 
Intra-
day / 
Season
s 
perfect 
competio
n 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
Endogen
ous 
no 
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Final 
Demand 
NATGA
S 
CPB - NL 
energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
EU/Multi-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
- transp. - year 
strategic 
behaviou
r 
(upstrea
m) 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
endogen
ous 
no 
GASTA
LE 
ECN - NL 
energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
EU/Multi-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
- transp. - year 
strategic 
behaviou
r 
(upstrea
m) 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
endogen
ous 
no 
GASM
OD 
DIW (DE) 
energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
EU/Multi-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
- transp. - year 
strategic 
behaviou
r 
(upstrea
m) 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
endogen
ous 
No 
Pegasu
s 
Poyry, UK 
energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
EU/Multi-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box + 
tech-
by-tech 
(Transp
., 
Storage
) 
Upstream, 
Storage, 
Supply, 
Final 
Demand 
- 
transp. 
(?) 
- day 
perfect 
competiti
on 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
endogen
ous 
No 
(Partial) 
equilibriu
m 
World 
Gas 
Trade 
Model 
RICE 
Univ. (US) 
energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
Global/M
ulti-
country 
Long-
term / 
Dynamic 
black 
box 
Upstream, 
Storage, 
Supply 
- transp. - year 
perfect 
competiti
on 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
endogen
ous 
No 
EUGAS 
/ TIGER 
EWI - 
Univ. 
Cologne 
(DE) 
energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
EU/Multi-
country 
Medium-
term/stat
ic (?) 
no 
Upstream, 
Storage, 
Supply 
- 
networ
k (?) 
- day 
perfect 
competiti
on 
perfect 
rationalit
y 
endogen
ous 
No 
WASP IAEA                             
CGEN 
 Cardiff 
Univ., 
Wales, 
UK 
                            
Energy 
sector 
models 
Infrastruc
ture and 
network 
GEMFL
OW 
JRC-IE energy 
sector 
gas 
market 
EU/Multi-
country 
(very) 
short-
term/stat
no Storage, 
Supply 
- transp. - day no no not 
modelled 
No 
   
 95 
ic 
Dynamic 
system 
                                
   
 
96 
ANNEX 9 
 
Fault tree and event tree analyses 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
Fault trees were first developed for missile launch control reliability back in 1961. It has 
been an essential part of nuclear safety since 1975 and is widely used in the chemical 
process industry to address safety and reliability problems during past decade.  
 
Fault tree analysis is a technique for identifying and analysing factors that can contribute to 
a specified undesired event (called top event). Causal factors are deductively indentified, 
organized in a logical manner and represented in a tree diagram which depicts causal factors 
and their logical relationship to the top event.  To complete the construction of a fault tree 
for a complicated system, it is necessary to first understand how the system functions. A 
system flow diagram is used for this purpose. The first step in fault tree construction is then 
the selection of the system failure event of interest the so called top event. Every following 
event will be considered in relation to its effect upon it.  
Fault tree Analysis permits the top event frequency to be estimated from a logic model of 
the failure mechanisms of a system. The model is based on the combinations of failures or 
more basic system components, safety systems, and human reliability. 
The underlying technology is the use of a combination of relatively simple logic gates 
(usually AND and OR gates) to synthesize a failure model of the system. In figure 1, the 
standard symbols used in Fault Tree Analysis are represented. The top event frequency or 
probability is calculated from failure data of more simple events. As well as providing 
quantitative information on top event, the fault tree can provide powerful qualitative insight 
into the potential failure modes of a complex system through minimal cut set analysis.  
Minimal cut set analysis is a mathematical technique for manipulating the logic structure of 
a fault tree to identify all combinations of basic events that results in the occurrence of the 
top event.  
A basic assumption in the FTA is that all failures in a system are binary in nature. That is, a 
component or operator either performs successfully or fails completely. In addition, the 
system is assumed to be capable of performing its task if all subcomponents are working. 
FTA treats only instantaneous failures.  
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Figure 1: Standard symbols used in Fault Tree Analysis 
 
Example:  
An LPG storage tank installation is sited close to a railway line on which trains pass carrying 
fuel oil to a power station. If a train derails it may either plough directly into the LPG storage 
installation or it may overturn with a consequent possibility of the fuel catching fire. The fire 
may cause the LPG installation to explode.  
It is possible to estimate the frequency of explosion of the LPG storage installation using the 
data below: 
 
Number of fuel oil trains per year     1000 
Derailment frequency per km travelled    0.4x10
-6
 
Length of average fuel oil train     0.5 km 
Length of LPG installation next to railway line   0.7 km 
Probability that a derailed train overturns    0.5 
Probability that an overturned train catches fire   0.1 
Probability that fire engulfs LPG tanks causing explosion  0.2 
Probability that a derailed train hits the LPG installation 
causing an explosion      0.05 
 
The fault tree for the top event: "LPG explosion" is presented below and provides a 
frequency of explosion = 2.3 x 10
-5
 yr
-1 
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Figure 2: Fault tree representation for the Top Event: LPG explosion 
 
 
Assuming that the installation is at risk until half the train is passed clear of the last tank, the 
total vulnerable track length is 0.7x1/2x0.5= 0.95. Hence frequency of derailment is 
0.95x1000x0.4x10
-6.
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Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event tree analysis was first developed in the aerospace and defence industry, but has now 
found widespread applications in risk analyses for both the nuclear and chemical industries.  
 
An event tree is a graphical logic model that identifies and quantifies possible outcomes 
following an initiating event. It is an inductive approach which works from cause to effect. 
The event tree provides systematic coverage of the time sequence of event propagation. 
Event trees are basically a modified form of the logic trees used in decision analysis and 
describe possible progression from a given initiating event via a series of binary branches 
representing success or failure of safety features or the occurrence or not of some physical 
event. Thus the event tree is a diagrammatic representation of all the potential ways in 
which an event (initiating event) can develop through a system. Two distinct applications 
can be identified. The pre-incident application examines the systems in place that would 
prevent incident-precursors from developing into incidents. The event tree analysis of such a 
system is often sufficient for the purpose of estimating the safety of the system. The post 
incident application is used to identify incident outcomes. In case of event trees the 
approach is left to right rather than top to bottom with the initiating event on the left and 
developing consequences expanding to the right.  
 
Example: post incident analysis of a large leakage of pressurized flammable material from an 
insulated LPG storage tank. An engineering analysis of the problem indicates that the 
potential consequences include BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion) of the 
tank if the leak is ignited. If the leak does not immediately ignite, it can drift toward a 
populated area with several ignition sources and explode (UVCE: unconfined vapour cloud 
explosion) or produce a flash fire. In Figure 3 an event tree is presented to predict possible 
outcomes from the leakages of LPG using some sample event tree data.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Event tree outcomes for LPG leakage. 
 
Example: ash tray on fire 
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Figure 4: Event tree for cigarette fire 
 
The branch point is where the logic path splits at the nodal question/event- is the ashtray 
extinguished? Each path or accident sequence is assigned a system outcome that is accident 
or no accident.  The convention used in event trees always put the mitigating or less 
damaging event in the upper branch. Thus the trees shows and increase in the severity of 
the consequence as it goes down.  
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ANNEX 10 
 
Uncertainty analysis via Monte Carlo 
 
The Monte Carlo method consists in sampling at random the vector of input parameters, 
running the system model computer code for each sample of that vector and getting a 
sample of the vector of output variables. Later on, the characteristics of the output variables 
may be estimated using the output samples obtained. One of the advantages of using the 
Monte Carlo method is that all statistical standard methods we need to estimate the output 
variables distributions and to test any hypothesis may be used. This makes it the most 
straightforward and powerful method available in the scientific literature to deal with 
uncertainty propagation in complex models. This method is valid for models that have static 
and also dynamic outputs. It is adequate for working with discrete and continuous inputs 
and outputs, and the implementation of computational algorithms required has no 
fundamental complexity.  
 
 
Figure 10.1.- Simple random sample of size 
100 of two random variables 
uniformly distributed in the 
region [0,1]x[0,1].  
Figure 10.2.- ECDF obtained from a simple 
random sample of size 100 of 
Y=X1+X2 and its theoretical CDF. 
 
Monte Carlo maps the input space into the output space point by point. In order to see this, 
let us consider a very simple model: Y=X1+X2. Suppose X1 and X2 follow independent uniform 
distributions both of them defined in the interval [0,1]. For this simple model an analytical 
propagation of uncertainties is feasible and the output Y follows a triangular distribution 
defined in the interval [0,2] and whose mode, mean and median are 1. This propagation may 
be done via Monte Carlo. First, a sample of size 100 is taken in the input space (see figure 
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A.1). For each point shown in figure 10.1, the value of the output is then computed. An 
empirical cumulative distribution function is built from the 100 values obtained (see figure 
10.2). For the sake of comparison the actual CDF of Y has also been drawn.  
 
Monte Carlo may also be seen as a numerical integration method. In the same example, let 
us consider that we are primarily interested in the estimation of the mean of Y. This means 
that we are trying to estimate  
 
21]1,0[]1,0[ 21
)( dxdxXXY ∫ × +=µ .                 (10.1) 
 
One of the possible approximations to compute this integral is to take the sample 
considered in figure 10.1 and figure 10.2 and to calculate the arithmetic mean 
 
( )∑ =
=
+=
100
1 21100
1
ˆ
i
i iiY
xxµ .                                                        (10.2) 
 
It is important to remark that the standard deviation of this estimator is  
 
nYY /ˆ σσ µ = ,                                                                      (10.3) 
 
where σY is the standard deviation of the output Y.  
 
 
  
Figure 10.3.-  Histogram of the sample means 
obtained from 50 simple random samples 
of size 100 obtained via Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
Figure 10.4.- ECDFs obtained from 50 simple random 
samples of size 100 obtained via Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
 
 
Figure 10.3, which shows the histogram obtained from 50 simple random samples of size 
100, similar to the one shown on figure 10.1 and figure 10.2. In this plot we can see that the 
range of Yµˆ  is roughly 0.2, which means it represents one tenth of the range of Y (the range 
of this triangular distribution is 2). Figure 10.4 shows the corresponding ECDFs.  
 
It is important to remark that the standard error of Yµˆ  does not depend on the dimension p 
of the space where the integral is computed, and that consequently the Monte Carlo 
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method does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Metropolis and Ulam (1949) is the 
seminal paper about Monte Carlo, where many interesting suggestions are made about its 
applicability. Readers interested in getting further details about the Monte Carlo method are 
suggested to see Hammersley and Handscomb (1964), Rubinstein (1981) and Robert and 
Casella (2004). 
 
References 
J.M. Hammersley and D.C. Handscomb (1964). Monte Carlo Methods. Chapman and Hall. 
N. Metropolis and S. Ulam (1949). The Monte Carlo Method. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association. Vol. 44, N. 247, 335-341. 
C.P. Robert and G. Casella (2004). Monte Carlo Statistical Methods. Springer. 
 
R.Y. Rubinstein. Simulations and Monte-Carlo Method. Wiley Series in Probability and 
Mathematical Statistics, J. Wiley & Sons, 1981 
   
 
104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
EUR 25227 -- Joint Research Centre -- Institute for Energy and Transport 
 
Title: Best Practices and Methodological Guidelines for Conducting Gas Risk Assessments 
 
Author(s): Ricardo Bolado-Lavin, Francesco Gracceva, Peter Zeniewski, Pavel Zastera, Lenhard Vanhoorn, Anna Mengolini 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
 
2012 -- 105 pp. -- 21.0 x 29.7 cm 
 
EUR -- Scientific and Technical Research series -- ISSN 1018-5593 (print), ISSN 1831-9424 (online) 
 
ISBN 978-92-79-23118-6 (pdf) 
ISBN 978-92-79-23117-9 (print) 
 
doi: 10.2790/44771 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The EC Regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply (EC/994/2010) requires member states to make a 
full assessment of the risks affecting the security of gas supply. According to Article 9, this risk assessment must: 
 
(a) use the infrastructure and supply standards (articles 6 and 8);  
(b) take into account all relevant national and regional circumstances;  
(c) run various disruption scenarios;  
(d) identify the interaction and correlation of risks with other Member States. 
(e) take into account the maximal interconnection capacity of each border entry and exit point. 
 
The objective of this report is to provide guidance and advice for performing risk assessments. It will do so by first providing a 
literature review, and then by proposing a basic structure for undertaking a gas security risk assessment, in accordance with 
best practices and standard procedures found in risk management 
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As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU 
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy 
cycle. 
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, and 
sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and food 
security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and security 
including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach. 
LD
-N
A
-2
5
2
2
7
-E
N
-N
 
